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CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE AND JUDIcIAL SCRUTINY*
LYNN A. BAKERt &
DANIEL B. RODRIGUEZ"
It may, in fact, be the case that cities, in effect, already have expan-
sive powers. But it would be more accurate to say that, because of
the ongoing judicial interpretation, no one really knows.
- Stephen L. Elkin
1
Without the benefit of guidance from history, constitutional tradition,
or sharply delineated principle, courts have been required to grapple
with the questions of what 'affairs' are 'municipal' and when 'police,





The distribution of powers between levels of government in the
state system presents a puzzle for constitutional theory; likewise, it
presents a puzzle-actually, more of a ubiquitous governance dilemma-
for modern policymaking. The specter of Hunter v. Pittsburgh and its
injunction that municipalities are best understood as creatures of state
government and, therefore, as fundamentally subordinate entities, 3 haunts
modern local government law. At the same time, constitutional home
rule conceivably upends the standard view by according a sphere of au-
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1. STEPHEN L. ELKIN, Crry AND REGIME IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 176 (1987).
2. Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643,661 (1964).
3. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); see also WILLIAM BENNETr
MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CrrEs 80 (3d ed. 1920) ("[The] municipal corporation,
is the creature of the state. Like all other corporations, it owes its existence to a statute, and it has no
powers save those which may be conveyed to it thereby."); Howard Lee McBain, The Doctrine of an
Inherent Right of Local Self-Government (pt. 1), 16 COLUM. L. REv. 190, 214 (1916).
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thority-indeed, a sovereignty of sorts-to municipalities in the state's
structure of governance and its constitutional theory. How constitutional
home rule can be reconciled with the Hunter principle is an enduring
puzzle in American local government law.4 Through scholarship, com-
mentary, and caselaw, informed observers struggle to make sense of this
seeming contradiction between the idea of local governments as suppli-
cants and the idea of these governments as governance partners.5
Underlying this enduring theoretical tension is a practical fact on
the ground: Defining the scope of this local sovereignty, and thereby
shaping the constitutional relationship between state and local govern-
ments, is a task that has largely fallen to the state courts.6 While home
rule is the creation of legislatures acting within constitutional conven-
tions or through other mechanisms,7 the contours and content of home
rule have been developed by the courts through adjudication. Home rule
doctrine reflects a far-flung effort over more than a century's time to find
meaning in the ambiguous phrases "local affairs" and "matters of state-
wide concern."8 The result of these efforts has been a highly developed,
and still developing, case law, one that involves drawing lines between
what is properly the domain of state government and those powers which
may be exercised by municipalities free of state preemption.
To be sure, the "disabling" or "immunity" function of home rule,
which aims to insulate certain local action from state control, was and is
controversial. 9 Indeed, most states disavow this function, either by hav-
ing no home rule at all ° or, more commonly, by having "legislative
home rule," which authorizes municipalities to exercise only those pow-
4. See e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85-86 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism]; Richard Briffault,
Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp: Extraterritoriality and Local Autonomy, 86 DEN".
U. L. REV. 1311, 1317 (2009) [hereinafter Briffault, Extraterrioriality and Local Autonomy].
5. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2260 (2003);
Gerald E. Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 256 (1993); Gerald E. Frg,
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1062-63 (1980) [hereinafter Frug, Legal
Concept].
6. See Sandalow, supra note 2, at 660; Sho Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in California, 60 CAL.
L. REV. 1055, 1058 (1972). In nine of the imperio home rule states, the home rule provision of the
state constitution lists matters that are deemed to be of local concern, though the list is not exclusive.
See infra Appendix (listing Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, New York, North
Dakota, South Carolina, and Utah as those nine states). Even in those states, however, it is ultimate-
ly the job of the courts to determine whether a particular exercise of municipal power falls within
one of the categories listed in the constitution.
7. See DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RiGOs & MELVIN B. HILL, JR., HOME RULE IN AMERICA 11
(2001); HOWARD LEE McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACrICE OF MUNIcIPAL HOME RULE 112-13
(1916).
8. See infra p. 1349.
9. See Frug, Legal Concept, supra note 5, at 1078; Sato, supra note 6, at 1059-60.
10. Five states have no municipal home rule at all: Alabama, Hawaii, Nevada, North Caroli-
na, and Vermont. See infra Appendix; see also KRANE ET AL., supra note 7, at 24-25 (Alabama),
269-70 (Nevada); 312-13 (North Carolina); 417-19 (Vermont). Hawaii has no municipal govern-
ments, but has home rule counties. Id. at 112-14; see infra Appendix. See generally KRANE Er AL.,
supra note 7, at 476-78.
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ers not prohibited by the state legislature." Still, there exists in many
other states-including the home state of this law reviewl 2-a deeply
imbedded recognition of the truly "imperium in imperio" 13 quality of
constitutional home rule and, with it, an acknowledgment that there are
circumstances in which, notwithstanding the Hunter principle, local go-
vernance is shielded from state intervention.
14
In this Article we ask: What are courts essentially doing when they
review state/local conflicts under the rubric of constitutional home rule?
And what insights into larger matters of judicial capability and doctrinal
efficacy are afforded by a close examination of this work of the state
courts? In Part I, we frame the home rule inquiry by describing in broad
outlines the constitutional structure of municipal home rule. In Part H,
we undertake some field archeology, involving a close look at how state
courts currently decide home rule cases. A better understanding of how
the courts approach the potentially difficult task of defining and drawing
lines between "local affairs" and "matters of statewide concern" will
usefully illuminate both the larger conundrum of imperium in imperio
home rule and the enterprise of line-drawing in structural constitutional
law cases more generally.'5 In Part II, we consider whether and to what
11. Twenty-three states currently have this form of home rule. The states include Alaska,
Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. See infra Appendix.
12. Twenty-three states currently have imperio home rule. In addition to the nine states listed
in note 6, supra, the states include Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix.
13. The phrase means "government within a government," and is thought to have been coined
in the local government context by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1893. In City of St. Louis v. Western
Union Tel. Co., the Court observed regarding the City of St. Louis:
It does not, like most cities, derive its powers by grant from the legislature, but it framed
its own charter under express authority from the people of the state, given in the constitu-
tion....
[AInd the powers granted by [the charter], so far as they are in harmony with the consti-
tution and laws of the state, and have not been set aside by any act of the general assem-
bly, are the powers vested in the city.... The city is in a very just sense an "imperium in
imperio." Its powers are self-appointed, and the reserved control existing in the general
assembly does not take away this peculiar feature of its character.
149 U.S. 465,467-68 (1893) (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 170-71 (Colo.
2008) (holding that the "legislature cannot prohibit the exercise of constitutional home rule powers,
regardless of the state interest which may be implicated by the exercise of those powers," and invali-
dating, as inconsistent with the constitution's home rule provision, a statute that would prohibit
extraterritorial condemnations of property by home rule municipalities); see also, e.g., LYNN A.
BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 298-311 (3d ed. 2004); RICHARD
BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAw 278-314 (7th ed. 2009); OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 111-46 (3rd
ed. 2009).
15. For earlier efforts along similar lines, see generally GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE
CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL AUTONOMY (1985); Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review in Local Gov-
ernment Law: A Reappraisal, 60 MINN. L. REv. 669 (1976); Frank J. Macchiarola, Local Govern-
ment Home Rule and the Judiciary, 48 J. URB. L 335 (1971); Sandalow, supra note 2. For the most
part, these important analyses emphasized normative considerations; that is, they considered whether
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extent the work of the state courts described in Part II can be deemed a
success. Such an assessment, we believe, has implications not only for
home rule and state constitutionalism, but also for the appropriate role of
the courts in demarcating and enforcing federal constitutional boundaries
of state regulatory immunity.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE
Home rule developed out of a Progressive era concern with the li-
mited scope and capacity of municipal governments in the state constitu-
tional system.' 6 Although prominent scholars and the occasional state
judge of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century sent up the trial
balloon of inherent local power, t7 the near consensus view in the consti-
tutional law of the times was that municipalities had only those powers
delegated to them by state legislatures. 8 Home rule promised a reconfi-
guration of this structural relationship.' 9 The early home rule amend-
ments to state constitutions empowered local governments by according
new legal significance to municipal charters and their delineation of local
powers and prerogatives.20 With that, home rule portended a new sche-
ma for local governance and, especially, a new relationship between state
and local governments.2 ' To be sure, these municipal charters existed in
the shadow of state constitutions, which had long included a variety of
limitations on both state and local power.22 Yet, the reconfiguration of
and to what extent judicial scrutiny of state/local conflicts was coherent and sensible (usually the
answer offered was "no"). While normative considerations are inescapable, the signal contribution
of this Article is to consider more carefully, and with the benefit of recent caselaw, how the courts
go about analyzing state/local disputes in constitutional home rule contexts. A fuller analysis of the
normative underpinnings of these analytical patterns is beyond the scope of this article.
16. See generally KRANE ET AL., supra note 7, at 11-12; Barron, supra note 5, at 2277-322;
Frug, Legal Concept, supra note 5, at 1080-119; Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal
Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 369, 392-431 (1985).
17. See, e.g., Hoagland v. City of Sacramento, 52 Cal. 142, 149 (1877); People v. Lynch, 51
Cal. 15, 34 (1875); People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 107-08 (1871) (Cooley, J., con-
curring); Eugene McQuillin, Constitutional Right of Local Self-Government of Municipalities, and
Principles Applicable to Central Control, 35 AM. L. REv. 510, 524 (1901). See generally David J.
Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487
(1999).
18. See BAKER & GILLETE, supra note 14, at 202-03; Frug, Legal Concept, supra note 5, at
1114-15. See generally HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE
CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983).
19. See, e.g., RODNEY L. MOTT, HOME RULE FOR AMERICA'S CITIES 11 (1949) ("During a
large part of the nineteenth century, under the dominant theory of legislative supremacy, cities were
considered to be merely creatures of the state legislature.... Cities were completely subservient to
legislative vagaries and whims .... Legislative interference with cities tends to turn state legisla-
tures into spasmodic city councils. Home rule, as a device for returning local business to the city, is
the obvious remedy for these evils.").
20. See KRANE ET AL.., supra note 7, at 11; see also the state constitutional provisions cited
supra note 12.
21. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 10.
22. See BAKER & GILLElrE, supra note 14, at 201-243 (discussing state constitutional limita-
tions on state power besides home rule); BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 278-314
(same); Michael E. Libonati, Local Government, in 3 STATE CONSITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CoNsTTmONAL REFORM 109-27 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert
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state/local relations represented by the home rule movement of the Pro-
gressive era was a substantial one; it harnessed the (progressive) power
of local governments and, not incidentally, gave these governments a
legal bulwark against their skeptical masters.23
Especially controversial was the protection that the home rule
amendments gave localities against state preemption of local laws. The
establishment of constitutional home rule, beginning first in Missouri and
then spreading among the states most enraptured by Progressive-era
lawmaking reforms,24 reconstituted state/local relations by creating, in
essence, an imperium in imperio.25 By putting into a state constitution a
guarantee that qualified cities would hereinafter enjoy home rule authori-
ty in the area of "local" or "municipal" affairs, the home rule reformers
were creating for municipalities both a power of initiation-that is, a
power to act in the absence of an express state legislative grant-and a
power of immunity-that is, a power to act in the specified area notwith-
standing any conflicting state law.26 This second sort of power proved
controversial, given the substantial tension between imperium in imperio
and the idea of local governments as creatures of state government. It is
one thing to view local governments as spheres of Jeffersonian democra-
cy and as separate institutions of governance in a wider polity;27 it is
another thing to see local governments as sovereign and independent
from the states that created them.
Moreover, by establishing a new legal architecture of state/local re-
lations centered on the divide between local and statewide affairs, the
constitutional home rule movement was assigning a critical task to
F. Willams eds., 2006) (discussing historical development of home rule provisions in the larger
context of the evolution of state constitutions).
23. See KRANE ET AL., supra note 7, at 11-12.
24. Id. at 241-42. See generally McBAN, supra note 7, at 119-99.
25. See supra note 17.
26. See BRtFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 331-32 (discussing the distinction be-
tween the "initiation" and "immunity" functions of home rule); see also BAKER & GILLEt FE, supra
note 14, at 307-11 (discussing distinction between "investing" and "divesting" functions of home
rule).
27. See Briffault, Extraterritoriality and Local Autonomy, supra note 4, at 1317. A particular-
ly florid statement of this ideal is found in an early decision of the California Supreme Court:
What did [the Constitution's framers] have in their minds when they spoke of cities and
villages? It needed but to recall their origin and history to impress the Constitutional
Convention with a conviction that municipalities are invaluable to a great and free
people. The enlightened genius of the Roman civilization was planted and fostered by
the establishment of colonies with urban privileges. In the Dark Ages the chartered
towns in Europe served to curb the turbulence of the more potent of the crown vassals,
and to erect barriers for the protection of personal rights against the rude force of the
feudal barons. It often happened that from such centres of self-government the spirit of
freedom was extended and expanded, and it may be safely be said of the English bo-
roughs-for example-that they were largely instrumental in developing the constitution
of government which made that people jealous of the liberty they possessed, and capable
of receiving still greater accessions of the same blessing. In our own country the exis-
tence of local political corporations began.. .
People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 29-30 (1875).
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courts, the task of constitutional interpretation. 28  Courts would now
make decisions regarding whether and to what extent a power was to be
assigned to localities and shielded from state intervention. In doing so,
they were creating a doctrine of constitutional localism 29 that would, in
suitable cases, enable and require the courts to invalidate acts of the leg-
islature that intruded on the locality's own preferences. This power re-
flected the critical but unstartling idea that state legislatures are subject to
the fundamental law as interpreted and implemented by courts through
judicial review. The power was extraordinary, however, in the further
sense that courts would be acting to protect the autonomy of local gov-
ernments that were historically understood to be mere creatures of the
state government. On these terms, imperium in imperio home rule was
even more remarkable than constitutional federalism. After all, the latter
was built upon the circumstances of the states existing as independent
sovereigns that joined together to form the nation, the United States.3°
Constitutional localism, in contrast, was built upon a notion that whatev-
er municipalities the state chose to create should, after creation, be ac-
corded a realm of autonomy from ex post control by their creator.31 As a
matter of theory, constitutional home rule represents an unusual and truly
radical reconstitution of the traditional model of state/local relations and
of the role of the courts in a constitutional system.
Our focus here, however, is constitutional home rule in practice.
While constitutional home rule on paper points to a delineated realm of
local sovereignty, the record of home rule in the state courts in this re-
gard is more mixed. Over the century of its existence, home rule doc-
trine has reflected in its structure the inherently difficult nature of the
core line-drawing project. In some states, constitutional home rule has
never been seriously contemplated; rather, home rule exists by virtue of
statutory grant.32 Indeed, the modern home rule movement, dating
roughly from the mid-1960s, is entirely the creature of state legislation.33
In a few states, home rule does not exist in either statutory or constitu-
tional form.34 Of the remaining states, in which constitutional home rule
exists, some have state courts that have largely declined to subject state
legislation to scrutiny under the rubric of home rule; in other words, they
28. See Sandalow, supra note 2, at 712.
29. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 98-99.
30. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 14-15 (1995).
31. It should be noted, however, that not all municipalities within an imperio home rule state
are eligible for "home rule" status. In some imperio states, home rule status is afforded only cities
that meet certain minimum population requirements. See REYNOLDS, JR., supra note 14, at 108-10.
See also, e.g., infra Appendix.
32. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 10-11; Kenneth Vanlandingham, Con-
stitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA (NL) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1 n.1
(1975). See also infra Appendix (Delaware, Indiana, Mississippi).
33. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 23; KRANE Er AL., supra note 7, at 12-13.
34. See supra note 10.
35. See supra note 12.
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have largely denied any immunity function to home rule.36 In these
states, local governments can act through their home rule powers; but
insofar as the state legislature attempts to preempt local action, the state
typically wins and local governments lose.37
Given the incentives for state courts to defer to statewide interests,38
to authorize encroachments on local sovereignty in the face of state legis-
lative preferences and demands, 39 it is remarkable that many state courts
over the years have accorded certain immunities to local governments
despite conflicting state legislation.4n In the face of considerable ob-
stacles, state courts have undertaken the tough task of sorting local from
statewide concerns, and of truly dividing powers between state and local
governments. It would surely be interesting to speculate about "why"
state courts do this. Our focus in this Article, however, is on "how" the
state courts do so and, moreover, on how that line-drawing project fits
into larger notions of court/state/local relations.
In considering how state courts deal with home rule controversies,
we leave for another day the larger questions of the constitutional status
of local governments. The structure of state/local relations involves
complex political considerations, as well as difficult constitutional ques-
tions. A full-bodied account of constitutional home rule in modern
36. See, e.g., Libonati, supra note 22, at 115 ("Courts in several jurisdictions where a consti-
tutional grant of home rule initiative is qualified by the adjective 'local' or 'municipal' have not been
shy in holding that the subject matter in question is susceptible to redefinition as a matter of state-
wide concern when the state legislature has so spoken."); James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule
in New York: "The Ghost of Home Rule," 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 713, 715 (1985) ("The balance
between state and local powers [in New York] has tipped away from the preservation of local au-
thority toward a presumption of state concern."); Eliot J. Kirshnitz, City of New York v. State of New
York: The New York State Court of Appeals, in Declaring the Repeal of the Commuter Tax Uncons-
titutional, Strikes another Blow against Constitutional Home Rule in New York, 74 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 935, 947-48 (2000) (contending that "under the 'state concern' doctrine [crafted by New York
courts], even if legislation relates to the property, affairs, or government of a city, if the legislation is
also a matter of state concern, home rule is not implicated and the legislature may act through ordi-
nary legislative process").
37. See, e.g., Kirshnitz, supra note 36, at 945-48 (citing and discussing New York cases);
KRANE Er AL., supra note 7, at 304 (noting that the highest court in New York "has consistently
rendered decisions 'protecting the Legislature's power to act by ordinary legislation if a "matter of
state concern" is involved,"' and that the "courts 'have found state concerns even in seemingly local
matters'); id. at 368 (noting regarding Rhode Island that "a series of decisions that struck down
municipal efforts to use charter language to secure substantive authority" has resulting in the consti-
tutional phrase "in all local matters" meaning "the structural aspects of local government and little
more").
38. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 639
(2001) ("state courts are most frequently made up of state judges who stand for election or re-
election; they are beholden to state voters, and not local governments, for their decisions").
39. Courts compromise local sovereignty either by narrowing the scope of local governments'
initiation power, or by limiting their immunity power, or both.
40. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 15 ("Despite the standard contention
that a crabbed judicial interpretation of the 'municipal affairs' language in home rule provisions has
limited local power to initiate measures, the most comprehensive study of the first decades of home
rule found that the courts generally permitted 'a fairly wide latitude of action on the part of the city
in its so-called capacity as an organization for the satisfaction of local needs."') (quoting McBAiN,
supra note 7, at 671).
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America requires engagement with both constitutional and political crite-
ria; for now, we explore only the question of how courts manage doctrine
where state and local power is in conflict. As the quotation from Dean
Sandalow preceding the introduction indicates, the conventional wisdom
is that courts have lurched in several directions in considering home rule
matters. The reality, however, is more nuanced, as we will show in the
next Part.
II. WHAT ARE COURTS DOING WHEN THEY DO HOME RULE?
The structure of constitutional home rule doctrine rests upon an ob-
ligation of the court to draw lines between what is properly state and
properly local. This obligation emerges directly from the court's duty to
interpret the pertinent language in the state constitution.4' Where the
state constitution grants localities sovereign power in the area of local
affairs, the task falls to the court to discern just what is or is not a local
affair. The nature of the project is necessarily ad hoc: The courts are
asked to evaluate specific exercises of municipal power against the back-
ground of language, typically "local affairs" or "municipal affairs," that
is notoriously ambiguous.42 And even where home rule power is defined
in a state constitution by resort to categories of activities,43 holding that
the activity or regulation in dispute falls within the scope of a specified
category is not the end of the court's inquiry where assertions of local
immunity are made.44
What makes a potentially unwieldy judicial project manageable is
the state courts' development and use of certain criteria, of general stan-
dards, against which the prerogatives of state and local governments can
be measured. We examine those standards and the courts' doctrines-
how the courts do home rule-in Part 1I below. First, however, it is
important to understand what the courts are doing when they do home
rule. As we explain in this Part, we believe that courts are undertaking
and accomplishing three objectives when they resolve constitutional
home rule controversies: first, they are dividing the total sum of go-
vernmental power between two levels of government and thereby assign-
ing functions (and, indeed, responsibilities) to these separate govern-
ments. Second, in defining and delimiting the categories of local and
statewide affairs, the courts are making analytical judgments about which
institutions are, and traditionally have been, best suited to perform cer-
tain tasks and functions. And, lastly, the courts are unavoidably making
41. We use duty here in its weak sense, that is, the "duty" to undertake constitutional interpre-
tation, taking no position upon whether and to what extent the constitution's text is the sole source of
information about the meaning of one or another state's home rule doctrine.
42. See, e.g., Sandalow, supra note 2, at 651, 660-61; Sato, supra note 6, at 1060, 1075-76.
43. The imperio home rule provisions of some state constitutions include non-exclusive lists
of these categories. See supra note 6.
44. See, e.g., KRANE Er AL., supra note 7, at 304 (discussing New York Constitution and
cases); id. at 79 (discussing Connecticut Constitution and cases).
1344 [Vol. 86:4
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substantive regulatory choices. Whether or not intentionally, judges are
choosing one regulatory result over another by the act of assigning the
regulatory prerogative to one level of government, or governmental insti-
tution, rather than another.
Home rule decisions involve conflicts between a locality insisting
that it has exclusive authority to act and the state government insisting
that this is incorrect. In resolving such conflicts, courts make what are
fundamentally distributive decisions involving the quantum of state and
local power. We offer two insights here: First, the courts conceive of
their role as separating spheres of authority between state and localities.
Thus viewed, power becomes a zero-sum game; either the state can
preempt local initiatives, thereby giving the state the last word, or else
localities can trump state interests and thereby become the final authori-
ty.45 The judgment in favor of one or another level of government there-
fore is a strong judgment about the nature of constitutional authority.
That is, the ultimate prerogative to act is within the province of one au-
thority or the other; governmental powers are exclusive, not shared.
Second, in allocating power between different levels of government,
the courts are also allocating authority among institutions of governance.
Where, for example, local governments proceed through administrative
agencies and special purpose governments, they claim immunity through
home rule just as if they had proceeded through the city council rather
than through unelected officials. By contrast, state decisionmaking is, in
the main, decisionmaking by and through the state legislature. The state
legislature is made up of a large number of representatives, each of
whom is directly elected in a single-member district.46 In addition, the
state legislature is configured to engage in compromise, conflict, logrol-
ling, and other institutionally salient activities characteristic of a general
purpose decisionmaking body.47 Local administrative agencies and spe-
cial purpose governments, in contrast, are centralized decisionmakers
that each act within a confined area of authority and competence pur-
45. One particularly significant question, to which we offer no answer in this Article, is
whether and to what extent the state legislature's express judgment that a matter is in fact one of
statewide concern is typically outcome determinative in imperio home rule states. Compare, e.g.,
Bishop v. City of San Jose, 460 P.2d 137, 141 (Cal. 1969) ("[Tlhe fact, standing alone, that the
Legislature has attempted to deal with a particular subject on a statewide basis is not determinative
of the issue as between state and municipal affairs ... the Legislature is empowered neither to de-
termine what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a matter of statewide
concern."), with Oelbermann Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. Borov, 535 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318-19 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1988) (holding that a state statute exempting loft apartments from local zoning requirements
was valid as applied to properties within a home rule city, notwithstanding language in New York
Constitution reserving to home rule governments the power to regulate "its property, affairs or
government").
46. See Rodriguez, supra note 38, at 646-55.
47. Cf id. at 648-58 (describing structural differences between state and local institutions and
some implications of these differences); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out:
Intrastate Aspects of Interstate Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 149, 172-75
(1997).
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suant to ideals of transparency and rational rulemaking. The result is that
home rule decisions favoring local authority are, in certain cases, favor-
ing institutions that are neither directly accountable to the affected elec-
torate nor concerned with the simple aggregation of the electorate's pre-
ferences.
It is also important to recognize that as the courts separate spheres
of authority, local governments gain immunity powers-and, thereby,
discretion-at the expense of state authority. By contrast to the relation-
ship between the federal government and the states, in which state au-
thority is today subject to nearly ubiquitous federal control even when
the states seemingly prevail under the Tenth Amendment,48 the effect of
a state court decision upholding local prerogatives in the face of state
authority is to cordon off localities from state authority in a strong sense.
States may resort to more draconian mechanisms of control to be sure,
but localities can maintain a reasonable capacity for resistance notwith-
standing the state's various options. Consider, for example, the authority
of local governments to generate their own revenue to further local ob-
jectives. While local taxing authority is curtailed in extraordinary and
rare circumstances-most notably, California after Proposition 1349 -the
ordinary baseline is broad local autonomy to carry out local initiatives so
long as the capacity for local revenue-generation exists.50 When courts
put their imprimatur on local authority of this sort, the practical effects of
immunity are considerable indeed.
Further, court decisions that assign an entire category of powers to
local prerogative may distribute governmental power in a way that is
difficult for state legislatures to revisit. The California Supreme Court's
decision in Johnson v. Bradley5' is an example of this phenomenon. In
that case, the state court accorded to the City of Los Angeles the broad
authority to create its own regulations for municipal elections, including
limitations on campaign contributions, the provision of partial public
funding for city political campaigns, and spending limits on candidates
who accept public funds. 52 The bell cannot be easily unrung; where es-
48. Although the "anti-commandeering" doctrine set out by the Court in New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997), has chipped
away at the seemingly plenary powers of Congress under the Tenth Amendment, see infra notes
177-79 and accompanying text, the spending power remains an easy end run around any restrictions
that the Constitution might be interpreted to impose on Congress's ability to regulate the states. See
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 1911, 1914 (1995);
Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAPMAN L. REV. 195, 195
(2001) [hereinafter Baker, Spending Power]; Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting offthe
Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress
Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 460 (2003).
49. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (imposing various limitations on the real property assessment
and taxing powers of state and local governments).
50. See Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause
Proposition 13?, 50 UCLA L. REv. 801, 814 (2003).
51. 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992).
52. Id. at 991-92.
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sential attributes of municipal government are configured around judicial
decisions upholding local power in light of home rule, state decisionmak-
ing in those areas must be adjusted to take account of this new reality.
53
Unavoidably, division of powers through judicial decree frames go-
vernmental choices going forward. It is hard to imagine state govern-
mental actors easily acquiescing to court decisions shielding local gover-
nance from state control and limiting state flexibility. Yet, while the
process is a predictably dynamic one, with state government tacking and
adjusting in response to judicial decisions, those decisions importantly
alter the terrain on which subsequent adjustments are made. Local gov-
ernments are rightly viewed not only, or even especially, as creatures of
state governments; they are also competitors with the states. In both
their regulatory and proprietary roles, local government frequently have
economic and political interests that may collide in discernible ways with
the interests of their state government. In distributing powers, courts are
regulating the rules of this competition. A truly comprehensive effort
(which this Article is not) to evaluate the efficacy of home rule in the
courts needs to tackle squarely the question of how the courts' choices in
the allocation of power between state and local governments impact the
governance strategies of state and local officials.
In addition to allocating powers between different levels and institu-
tions of government, the courts' home rule decisions reflect and imple-
ment substantive regulatory choices. When, for example, a Colorado
court struck down the town of Telluride's attempt to impose residential
rent control on new development within the town, the scope of local reg-
ulatory choice was curtailed.54 In ruling that the Colorado law prohibit-
ing municipalities from imposing residential rent control trumped Tellu-
ride's ordinance imposing such a regime, 55 the court was not only affirm-
ing the state's power to regulate in this area. It was also ultimately rein-
forcing the legislature's substantive regulatory preference that residential
rental properties within the state not be subject to rent control.
Consider a different example, involving an ordinance of the Illinois
village of Morton Grove that banned the possession by civilians of all
operable handguns. 6 Those challenging the ordinance contended that it
violated the Illinois Constitution, which provided that "Subject only to
the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed., 57 When the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
ordinance, it reaffirmed the power of localities to choose whether and
53. Or the state constitution must be amended to redefine the affected areas as "matters of
state concern."
54. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).
55. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 40.
56. Kalodimos v. Vin. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 269 (111. 1984).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
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how to regulate in this area. But in doing so, the court also reinforced
the village's regulatory preference for more stringent firearms control.
At some level, this is a banal insight-of course home rule decisions
involve substantive regulatory choices by the courts. But our point here
is a deeper one: How we evaluate and assess the resulting home rule
doctrine is bound up with our views about the substantive regulations
involved.
Consider the underlying regulatory choice in the 2008 case of Town
of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.58 The town of Telluride made
the bold decision to use eminent domain to expand its extraterritorial
regulatory terrain. While the locality's underlying motivation was not
entirely transparent, it appeared that the citizens of Telluride had a strong
pre-existing commitment to maintaining a protective barrier of open
space land at the boundaries of their community. 59 Local government
control over the land, including control over the location and extent of
any proposed private development, was a sensible way for the strongly
pro-environmental citizens of Telluride to realize and enforce their poli-
cy preferences. The four private corporations that owned the 572 acres
at issue, meanwhile, were interested developing the land in the future,
and had successfully lobbied the Colorado legislature for a statute of
general applicability that would block Telluride's ability to acquire the
Valley Floor via eminent domain. 60 The court's inquiry into whether
Telluride exceeded its powers under Colorado's home rule doctrine was
ultimately no more nor less than a choice between two very different
regulatory policies-would the Valley Floor be developed or would it
remain open space? Home rule disputes, and their resolution, can often
be characterized thusly.
It is important to note, however, that these substantive regulatory
choices are not naked ones. As we discuss in greater detail in the next
section of this Article, courts typically offer more than a fig leaf for the
regulatory preferences of the state and local officials who prevail in
home rule disputes. In addition, the courts are rightly cautious and in-
cremental in their implementation of these substantive regulatory choic-
es. Judgments regarding the character of certain local decisionmaking
and the operationalization of the standard home rule criteria are both
connected to prior decisions involving the same or similar matters. In
sum, the structure of home rule decisions and the criteria employed by
the courts in resolving disputes in difficult cases reveals a reasonably
nuanced approach to regulatory decisionmaking.
58. 185 P.3d 161(Colo. 2008).
59. For example, the Court noted that the citizens of Telluride, "for years have allocated
twenty percent of the town's annual revenue to fund the acquisition of the Valley Floor" for open
space and park purposes. Id. at 164.
60. Id. at 163-64.
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III. THE STRUCTURE OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
We have discussed what the courts are doing when they do home
rule: they allocate powers between different levels and institutions of
government, and they implement substantive regulatory choices. In this
Part, we explore how the courts make those decisions. That is, we ex-
amine the standards and criteria that the courts apply in these cases, and
the legal doctrine(s) that result.
State courts typically approach home rule questions through a set of
standards that are framed around three core questions:
" Is the activity or regulation at issue a local affair?
" Is it a matter of statewide concern?
" Is it a mixed matter that is of both statewide and local concern?
We begin this Part by examining the doctrines that the state courts
of California, Colorado, and Illinois have crafted around the three core
questions. We discuss the four factors that the courts typically invoke in
resolving state-local conflicts, and give special attention to the two fac-
tors that seem to loom largest in the courts' decisionmaking: the extra-
territorial effects of the local regulation, and the need for statewide un-
iformity in the relevant regulatory area. We then explore the possibility
that the subject matter at issue affects the courts' decisionmaking; that is,
that cases within a given substantive "category" are treated similarly,
while the categories are treated somewhat differently.
A. Imperio Home Rule Doctrine
Study of three courts in imperio home rule states reveals that they
approach the three core questions in a similar. and admittedly ad hoc,
manner. The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, begins its inquiry in
a 1990 decision by noting that
We have not developed a particular test which could resolve in every
case the issue of whether a particular matter is "local," "state," or
"mixed." Instead, we have made these determinations on an ad hoc
basis, taking into consideration the facts of each case.... We have
considered the relative interests of the state and the home rule muni-
cipality in regulating the matter at issue in a particular case.6'
In a later decision, the Colorado Court elaborated:
"There is no litmus-like indicator for resolving whether a matter is of
local, statewide, or mixed concern." ... Courts should take the to-
tality of the circumstances into account in reaching this legal conclu-
sion. ... As part of the totality of the circumstances, this court has
61. City & County of Denver v. State of Colorado, 788 P.2d 764, 767-68 (Colo. 1990).
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considered a number of issues, all directed toward weighing the re-
spective state and local interests implicated by the law.
62
The Illinois Supreme Court has articulated similar views:
Whether a particular problem is of statewide rather than local dimen-
sion must be decided not on the basis of a specific formula or listing
set forth in the Constitution but with regard [to various factors].63
And the California Supreme Court has taken a comparable approach:
'No exact definition of the terms "municipal affairs" can be formu-
lated and the courts have made no attempt to do so, but instead have
indicated that judicial interpretation is necessary to give it meaning in
each controverted case."'.. . At the same time, however, we noted
that "our decisions have also strived to confine the element of judi-
cial interpretation by hedging it with a judicial rocedure intended to
bring a measure of certainty to the process ....
The "judicial procedure" mentioned by the California Court begins
with a presumption that local ordinances are of "local concern" (and
therefore presumptively valid), thereby putting the burden of proof on
those contending that the local ordinance must yield to a conflicting state
law:
If... the court is persuaded that the subject of the state statute is one
of statewide concern and that the statute is reasonably related [and
'narrowly tailored'] to its resolution, then the conflicting charter city
measure ceases to be a 'municipal affair' pro tanto and the Legisla-
ture is not prohibited by [the Constitution's home rule provision]
from addressing the statewide dimension by its own tailored enact-
ments.65
The Colorado court starts from a somewhat different point, stating
that if "the matter is one of mixed local and statewide concern," and if
the action of the home rule city conflicts with the state legislature's ac-
tion, then "the state statute supersedes the home rule authority."66 The
court adds that "[e]ven if a home rule city has considerable local interests
at stake, a particular issue may be characterized as 'mixed' if sufficient
state interests are also implicated. 67 Lest this be interpreted as a strong
presumption in favor of the state in close cases, an earlier opinion of the
court suggests otherwise: "even though the state may be able to suggest
a plausible interest in regulating a matter to the exclusion of a home rule
62. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).
63. Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 274 (111. 1984).
64. Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990,995-96 (Cal. 1992).
65. Id at 996.
66. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 37.
67. Id. at 37.
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municipality, such an interest may be insufficient to characterize the mat-
ter as being even of 'mixed' state and local concern." 68
The Illinois court in Kalodimos, meanwhile, staked out a starting
point somewhere between those of the California and Colorado courts.
The Illinois court contrasts imperio home rule to "a free-wheeling
preemption rule" that "a subject is preempted whenever it is of signifi-
cant concern to the State .... ,, 69 "Home rule," the court clarifies,
is predicated on the assumption that problems in which local gov-
ernments have a legitimate and substantial interest should be open to
local solution and reasonable experimentation to meet local needs,
free from veto by voters and elected representatives of other parts of
the State who might disagree with the particular approach advanced
by the representatives of the locality involved or fail to appreciate the
local perception of the problem.
70
This seemingly strong presumption in favor of local autonomy is
importantly tempered by the Illinois Court's subsequent observation that
the local diversity intentionally fostered by home rule is subject to the
proviso "that the legislature has taken no affirmative steps to circum-
scribe the measures that may be taken and that the measures taken [by
the locality] are reasonable. 71
Nothwithstanding these somewhat different starting points, each of
the courts goes on to identify some variant of the following factors as
being at the core of its analysis:
9 the need for statewide uniformity of regulation;
*the impact of the measure on individuals living outside the
municipality;
ehistorical considerations concerning whether the subject matter
is one traditionally governed by state or local governments; and
* whether the state Constitution specifically commits the particu-
lar matter to state or local regulation.72
Each of the courts makes clear that the multi-factor analysis is not a
formula but rather a kind of balancing test: "All of these factors are in-
tended to assist the court in measuring the importance of the state inter-
68. City & County of Denver v. State of Colorado, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990).
69. Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266,274 (fll. 1984).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 275-76.
72. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 37; see also City & County of Denver, 788 P.2d at 768
(discussing same four factors); Kalodimos, 470 N.E.2d at 274 (identifying as the relevant factors
"the nature and extent of the problem, the units of government which have the most vital interest in
its solution, and the role traditionally played by local and statewide authorities in dealing with it");
Johnson, 841 P.2d at 996, 1001 (identifying as central to the home rule analysis a focus on "extra-
municipal concerns" and an interest in statewide uniformity).
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ests against the importance of the local interests in order to make the ad
hoc decision as to which law should prevail.",
73
Although at least some of the factors just described are mentioned
in nearly every home rule case, a close examination of constitutional
home rule cases over the years discloses that some of these factors play a
more significant role than others. Especially important in home rule
analysis are the questions of how much weight to give the state's interest
in uniformity and how to view local regulations which arguably have
extraterritorial effects. Not surprisingly, the need for statewide uniformi-
ty and concerns about extraterritorial effects of local decisions loom
large as factors in home rule analyses. 
74
At a basic level, the inquiries into uniformity and extraterritoriality
raise the common question of comparative institutional competence, to
wit: Would states or localities be better decisionmakers with regard to a
particular issue? For example, in Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four
Venture, L.L. C.,75 the Colorado Supreme Court decided that the citizens
of Colorado have an interest in consistent, uniform landlord-tenant regu-
lation.76 "Uniformity in landlord-tenant relations," said the court, "fos-
ters informed and realistic expectations by the parties to a lease, which in
turn increases the quality and reliability of rental housing, promotes fair
treatment of tenants, and could reduce litigation., 77  Embedded in this
judgment is a belief that states would in fact maintain a consistent struc-
ture of landlord-tenant law. To the extent that the law would have gener-
al application statewide, this seems a realistic assumption.
Less clear, however, is the state's willingness and ability to craft a
law that assures "informed and realistic expectations" for the parties.
Forbidding localities from adopting residential rent control, for example,
does not assure uniformity in rents across localities; indeed it may well
facilitate the opposite. And there is little reason to believe that there is
consistency across a given state's localities in the supply of, and demand
for, different types of real estate. Uniformity in this context simply
73. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 37; see also id. at 39 ("On the whole, we cannot con-
clude that this matter is so discretely local that all state interests are superseded" and acknowledging
"the legitimacy of both the state interests and [the municipality's] interests"); City & County of
Denver, 788 P.2d at 768 ("We have considered the relative interests of the state and the home rule
municipality in regulating the matter at issue in a particular case"); id. at 770 (comparing "the as-
serted state interests" with "the asserted local interests"); Kalodimos, 470 N.E.2d at 274 ("Whether a
particular problem is of statewide rather than local dimension must be decided not on the basis of a
specific formula... but with regard for [various factors]."); Johnson, 841 P.2d at 997 ("the hinge of
the [home rule] decision is the identification of a convincing basis for legislative action originating
in extramural concerns..." and "the sweep of the state's protective measures may be no broader
than its interest").
74. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Colo. Lodge #27 v. City & County of Denver, 926
P.2d 582, 588-90 (Colo. 1996); City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 768-69 (Colo.
1990).
75. 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).
76. Id. at 38.
77. Id.
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means that municipalities cannot pursue their own localized judgments
about whether and to what extent rents ought to be capped-judgments
that presumably can be readily known by both residential landlords and
their prospective tenants and thus in no way preclude "informed and rea-
listic expectations by the parties to a lease."
Thus, the court's true concern in Lot Thirty-Four Venture appears to
be a simple distrust that localities will craft and carry out their own real
estate policies with sufficient concern for safeguarding the policies that
the state deems essential for all lease parties within the state. This is, at
base, a judgment about substantive policy preferences and the compara-
tive competence of different levels of government rather than a funda-
mental interest in statewide uniformity.
A similar consideration is at work in home rule decisions in which
local policies arguably raise concerns about extraterritorial effects. In
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. City & County of Denver,
for example, the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated under its constitu-
tional home rule doctrine a local law that provided for the construction of
a viaduct on the ground that this law would generate a potential ripple
effect outside the municipality.79 The local law did not, by its own
terms, have an extraterritorial reach. But the court viewed it as creating
externalities, as effecting an extraterritorial impact, and therefore impli-
cating a matter of statewide concern. Interestingly, the Colorado court in
the 2008 Telluride decision considered a challenge to a local ordinance
that, by design, had an extraterritorial impact.80 Yet the court approved
this assertion of extraterritorial local power in the face of a conflicting
state statute.81
Extraterritorial impact has considerable traction and appeal as a
home rule criterion; it is difficult to see municipal legislation as dealing
with purely local concerns when it explicitly or predictably affects indi-
viduals outside the municipality.82 However, the juxtaposition of clearly
and intentionally extraterritorial legislation (as in Telluride v. San Mi-
guel)83 and facially local legislation that ultimately also impacts individ-
uals outside the jurisdiction suggests that the criterion is not, and cannot
be, applied mechanically. Rather, the principal consideration at work
here, as in the case of concerns about a need for statewide uniformity, is
78. This is reinforced by Chief Justice Mullarkey's dissenting opinion in which she insists
that the Telluride ordinance "is fundamentally a land use regulation," and therefore is properly local.
Id. at 45 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Mullarkey argues that the majority goes wrong
by narrowing the scope of what is a land use decision. "Land use policy," she says, "is not limited to
the mere definition of permissible uses; rather, land use policy encompasses conditions implemented
within the rubric of zoning and planning decisions." I
79. 673 P.2d 354, 362 (Colo. 1983).
80. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161,163-64 (Colo. 2008).
81. Id. at171.
82. See Briffault, Extraterritoriality and Local Autonomy, supra note 4, at 1324-25.
83. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d at 163-64.
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how best to view the relative competence of localities and the state. Un-
der what circumstances, if at all, can localities reasonably be expected to
enact legislation whose effects are restricted to the locality's boundaries?
Can and will states do a better job than individual localities at balancing
the local and external effects of particular policy preferences?
The central insight of most academic treatments of externalities,
collective action problems, and races to the bottom that view them
through a political economy lens is that some central mechanism is ne-
cessary to regulate intergovernmental competition.84 Yet home rule doc-
trine pushes back against this insight. Protecting a sphere of local sove-
reignty requires the courts to roll up their sleeves and analyze state/local
conflicts with a richer vocabulary and greater nuance than political econ-
omy would provide. The criteria of statewide uniformity and extraterri-
torial effects invite consideration of the comparative institutional compe-
tence of state and local governments: What are the best institutions to
implement intrastate public policy? The answer, of course, is "some-
times the state, sometimes local governments." The courts' ad hoc home
rule inquiries, guided by principles and illuminated by precedent, may in
fact be the best and most reliable route to the right answer when disputes
arise.
One cannot overlook the fact, however, that assessing the compara-
tive institutional competence of state and local governments requires
some baseline. For example, what do we mean by "competence"? The
prevailing conception of local governments and their functions has
shifted considerably over time; what might have been seen as a compe-
tent regime of local governance in, say, the early twentieth century may
not seem so today. To a significant degree, local governments were his-
torically viewed as mechanisms for implementing state goals. State leg-
islatures had plenary powers including the police power; municipalities
were viewed as little more than the instruments for ensuring that the
states' policy choices were realized. The home rule movement of the
early twentieth century (and also as it evolved later) reconfigured this
idea; local governments were, to be sure, implementation mechanisms,
but they were also increasingly viewed as institutions that possessed a
police power in their own right. Indeed, home rule made concrete, and
legally salient, the notion that many basic police power functions-
including the protection of health, safety, and general welfare-were
well within the competence of, and even perhaps best effectuated by,
municipal governments.8 5 Courts reliably sustained local authority to
regulate private conduct in order to protect social aims and to ensure the
84. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENY. U. L. REV. 1241, 1249-50
(2009).
85. The "good government" movement of the Progressive era, described ably in Barron, supra
note 5, at 2291, was the administrative-political analogue of the home rule doctrine of this early
period.
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welfare of their citizens. And, strikingly, the courts did so notwithstand-
ing influential doctrines such as Dillon's Rule that would have otherwise
narrowed greatly the scope of local power.86
This changing conception of local governments will necessarily im-
pact what one means by competent local governance. Likewise, the
changing dynamic of state/local relations will affect what one means or
does not mean by competent state governance. Any comparison of these
competencies requires agreement on a baseline; we need to frame the
issue of state and local competence around ideas and ideals of state and
local governance in operation. While state courts typically, and properly,
elide identifying a theoretical baseline and implementing a judgment
about comparative institutional competence, the most analytically sophis-
ticated home rule cases do bear down on the question of how effectively
state and local institutions each fulfill the regulatory objective(s) at issue.
B. Home Rule and Regulatory Categories
Notwithstanding the self-professed "ad hoc" nature of the courts'
home rule decisions, the factors on which their inquiries are based can be
expected to yield patterns and consistencies in the eventual decisions. In
addition, both the nature of the factors and of the most frequent areas of
regulatory conflict between localities and the states suggest that one
might expect to find that cases within a given substantive "category" are
treated similarly, while the various categories are treated somewhat diffe-
rently. To be clear, we make no claim that the courts are deciding home
rule cases exclusively, or even especially, with reference to the regulato-
ry categories at issue. As mentioned above, the essential structure of
analysis is organized around multi-faceted inquiries into state and local
competence and, to some degree, historical exegesis. Yet, when one
looks at a large body of home rule cases covering the terrain of regulato-
ry policymaking, one sees that the regulatory categories matter, and in
ways that previous analyses of constitutional home rule insufficiently
credit. Therefore, in this section, we preliminarily explore the possibility
that the regulatory categories explain some of the pattern of home rule
decisions. We make no attempt to offer a comprehensive picture; rather,
we look closely at a few cases in some key substantive areas.
86. Dillon's Rule is a canon of statutory construction that calls for the narrow interpretation of
local government authority. See BAKER & Gal=ErrE, supra note 14, at 244 (setting out Dillon's
Rule); See also, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 314-17 (describing inception of
Dillon's Rule); David J. Barron, supra note 17, at 506-09 (explaining Dillon's Rule and its applica-
tion); Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The
Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 83, 88-90 (1986) (discussing Cooley's
theory of inherent local sovereignty).
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1. Health, safety, and welfare cases
In many cases, courts are called upon to resolve disputes between
state and local governments in which localities assert authority to regu-
late pursuant to their police power, the scope of which is ordinarily
spelled out in their municipal charter. These cases have involved a range
of issues, such as health codes, quarantines, curfews, and the batch of
issues that arose with the growing urbanization of the U.S. These cases
have seldom implicated the "immunity" function of home rule; after all,
states have been generally receptive to localities' efforts to promote
health, safety, and welfare. In the few cases in which localities have
gone many steps further than what the state deemed acceptable, the
courts have worked hard to reconcile state and local authority. Where no
reconciliation was possible, the courts have frequently upheld municipal
police power regulations in the face of state efforts at control 7 In this
way, courts across a range of constitutional home rule states have made
clear that regulating the "health, safety, and welfare" of a locality is
squarely within the scope of local affairs.
Given the well-established plenary powers of state legislatures and
the correlative police powers vested in the state (as opposed to the na-
tional) government, it is by no means obvious that localities possess any-
thing like these police powers. Yet, the state courts have long affirmed
the police powers of home rule local governments to promote health,
safety, and welfare, sometimes on the grounds set out by Justice Lehman
in the early home rule case of Adler v. Deegan:
88
It cannot be gainsaid that in this section of the Constitution cities re-
ceive not from the Legislature but from the sovereign people of the
State, authority to exercise some part of the police power of the State
and the exercise of that authority is made the function not of a desig-
nated local legislative body or city officer but of the city itself. Its
exercise does not rest upon delegation of power by the Legislature.
Within its limited scope it is derived from the same fundamental law,
from which the Legislature derives its own general power. The state
... has not surrendered its police power but it has to some extent di-
vided it between the Legislature and the cities and clearly the exer-
cise of the function bestowed on cities is a matter of city govern-
ment.
89
To be sure, Justice Lehman's observation does little to resolve situa-
tions of state and local conflict. To say that local governments have
some measure of police power and can thereby undertake to protect
87. See, e.g., Porter v. City of Santa Barbara, 35 P.2d 207, 207-08 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934);
Er parte Hitchcock, 166 P. 849, 849-51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917); see also William Carey Jones,
"Municipal Affairs" in the California Constitution, 1 CAL. L. REv. 132, 144 (1913); Sato, supra
note 6, at 1094-98.
88. 167 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929).
89. Id. at 715 (Lehman, J., dissenting).
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health, safety, and welfare in their communities is a far cry from viewing
the resulting regulations as addressing solely matters of local concern.
Some state courts, however, have built upon this acknowledgement of
local police power authority a case for some local prerogative in certain
instances.
Consider, for example, the 1984 case of Kalodimos v. Village of
Morton Grove, in which the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether a
local handgun regulation was properly within the scope of local affairs.90
The court was strongly inclined to protect the local regulations from any
claimed state interest in displacing local prerogative in the area of gun
control. The court's analysis took as its starting point the notion just
described, that matters of health and safety are properly viewed as local.
However, the Illinois court stopped short of proclaiming that local gun
control can be completely shielded from state intervention. The justices
ended their opinion with the qualification that local handgun laws are
within the scope of municipal home rule "provided that the legislature
has taken no affirmative steps to circumscribe the measures that may be
taken . ,,91
2. Land use/zoning
Zoning power, post-Village of Euclid,92 was quickly and aggressive-
ly asserted by local governments to be a matter within their prerogative.
To a great extent, states sat back and let municipalities make these deci-
sions about how best to regulate local (and especially urban) space. Lo-
cal authority to regulate land uses was, predictably, challenged by indi-
viduals and businesses adversely affected by these regulations. Home
rule localities typically responded that zoning was a quintessentially lo-
cal affair. To a great extent, courts agreed. Since the 1970s, however,
the issue has become more complicated due to two (at least) major de-
velopments: (1) the rise of environmental protection efforts at the state
level which implicated local initiatives. The problem here, usually, was
with the absence of zoning laws at the local level; and, relatedly, (2) the
anti-sprawl movement. 94
Although the issue has become messier in recent decades, the courts
still generally side with local governments in zoning disputes, in part no
doubt because the core idea of local control over land use has become a
deeply embedded norm. Classic zoning cases illustrate well the reluc-
90. Kalodimos v. Viii. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 269 (111. 1984).
91. Id. at 276.
92. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
93. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization and the
Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 1193, 1266-68 (2008); Richard
Briffault, Our Localism Part ll-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 346, 366 (1990);
Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1154, 1154-56
(1955).
94. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 5, at 2259-63.
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tance of state courts to displace local decisionmaking in land use con-
texts.95 Local zoning power is generally upheld against state interven-
96tion.
Colorado cases over the course of the last 100 years reveal the
courts' grappling with the problem of how to reconcile a broad local
power in regulating land use with a variety of legitimate statewide inter-
ests including the state's interest in uniformity across localities. This
issue was at the heart of two recent Colorado Supreme Court cases in-
volving the town of Telluride. First, in Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-
Four Venture, L.L.C.,97 the court in 2000 considered whether a local or-
dinance seeking to ensure the availability of affordable housing could be
shielded from a general legislative prohibition against rent control.98 The
state legislature made its intentions clear in the statute: "The general
assembly finds and declares that the imposition of rent control on private
residential housing units is a matter of statewide concern. '99 Although it
recognized that land use policy is "an area traditionally regulated by lo-
cal government[,]" 1 the court concluded that rent control has both local
and statewide implications. °1 As such, the state legislature was within
its prerogative, consistent with Colorado's constitutional home rule pro-
vision, to displace Telluride's ordinance with its conflicting state law.
For Chief Justice Mullarkey in dissent, the principal flaw in the Lot
Thirty-Four Venture majority's reasoning was its re-characterization of
the local law as being not strictly a land use regulation because "the or-
dinance does not dictate permissible uses of real property."10 2 Tacit in
Chief Justice Mullarkey's dissent is the view that if the local ordinance
were properly viewed as a land use regulation, then the state's interests
would be required to give way to the interests of the municipality.0 3
Although Chief Justice Mullarkey's position did not prevail in the
2000 Telluride case, the basic structure of her argument won the day in
the more recent Telluride case of San Miguel Valley Corp. 104 Here, as
was discussed above, the issue was the municipality's exercise of emi-
nent domain authority for open space/park purposes.10 5 There could be
little dispute that the regulation at issue was a "land use policy." Given
95. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
96. See Barron, supra note 5, at 2378-79; Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 39-58.
97. 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).
98. Id. at 32.
99. CoL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-301 (West 2000).
100. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 39 n.9.
101. Id. at 39.
102. Id. at 45 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting).
103. See id.
104. 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008).
105. Id. at 163.
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the Colorado court's earlier decision in Lot Thirty-Four Venture, one
might have anticipated, nonetheless, that the court would proceed to con-
sider whether this local land use policy conflicted with matters of state-
wide concern and therefore whether this was a case of mixed local and
statewide interests. Not so. The court, incredibly, held the local gov-
ernment's land use policies to be shielded from state control whether or
not statewide interests were implicated. 1°6 Justice Rice declared:
[N]o analysis of competing state and local interests is necessary
where a statute purports to take away home rule powers granted by
the constitution....
[Therefore] we decline here to evaluate the statewide interests impli-
cated by the extraterritorial condemnation of property by home rule
municipalities for open space and parks. The legislature cannot pro-
hibit the exercise of constitutional home rule powers, regardless of
the state interests which may be implicated by the exercise of those
107powers.
As these two cases illustrate, the force of the "land use is local"
principle is a strong one.108 At the same time, the structure of the Colo-
rado Supreme Court's reasoning pivots on what exactly is meant by a
"land use policy." In a general sense, most local regulations dealing in
some way with real property can be characterized as land use regula-
tions; by this logic (conspicuous in Chief Justice Mullarkey's dissent in
the 2000 case'019 and in the majority's opinion in the 2008 Telluride
case'10), the states are quite limited in their ability to displace local regu-
lations dealing with land. In a more specific sense, however, courts fre-
quently look at what issues are implicated at the statewide level by a
particular local regulation of land. The issues of extraterritorial effects
and of the state interests in uniformity are central to this inquiry. Indeed,
as was noted in Part m.A above, these two interests are two of the four
criteria against which the Colorado Supreme Court evaluates constitu-
tional home rule "immunity" claims. It is by no means clear, after the
2008 Telluride decision, whether the Colorado courts have decisively
cordoned off from state interference local laws dealing with land. In-
deed, given the wide swath of issues implicated by local land use regula-
tion, one might expect that controversies will continue to arise in this
area under Colorado law.
106. Id. at 170.
107. Id. at 169-70.
108. See, e.g., id. at 167 (emphasis added): "Ulpon review of pertinent Colorado law, and
considering our state tradition of conducting land planning at the local level, we conclude that
condemnation for open space and parks is in fact a lawful, public, local, and municipal purpose
within the scope of article XX."
109. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 45 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting).
110. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d at 171.
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Despite this longstanding preference for local prerogative in the
area of zoning, there are some signs that the balance may ultimately shift
in the direction of the state, in Colorado and elsewhere. Most notable in
this regard are the expansion of state interests in environmental protec-
tion in recent decades, and the post-Kelo" 1 property rights movement,
which, at the state level, undertakes to limit significantly the discretion of
local governments to engage in redevelopment takings." 2 Both of these
movements have the potential to reshape considerably the legal relation-
ship between state and local governments in the area of land use regula-
tion without necessarily requiring any change in the courts' core view of
land use regulation as a local affair. Time will tell whether and to what
extent the courts ultimately reconstitute the relationship between state
and local governments in the area of land use.
3. Employer/employee relations
Courts typically assert that employer/employee relations implicate
matters of statewide concern, and require localities to defer to state legis-
lative judgments in this area. 1 3 This tendency is a bit surprising in light
of the fact that the extraterritorial impact of, and the state interest in un-
iformity in, local employer/employee relations are not apparent.' 4  The
state government's interest in this area is really an anti-interest, that is, an
interest in resisting local experimentation. Local decisionmakers, to be
sure, maintain a strong prerogative to set terms and hours of work and of
wages in the first instance; yet, where state law intervenes, courts almost
111. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (5-4 decision holding that city's exer-
cise of eminent domain power to further an economic development plan satisfies the "public use"
requirement of the Fifth Amendment).
112. See Marci A. Hamilton, Political Responses to Supreme Court Decisions, 32 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 113, 120-21 (2009) (discussing response to Kelo, including fact that 13 states in-
cluded takings initiatives on their ballots in 2006); Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEo.
L.J. 1987, 1988-89 (2008) (observing that Kelo "resulted in legal backlash in many states in the form
of new legislation increasing restrictions on the use of eminent domain for private economic devel-
opment and in judicial rulings interpreting state legal limits on the use of eminent domain more
stringently than Kelo's reading of the federal Constitution").
113. See, e.g., Healy v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 258 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1953); Wilson v. Walters,
119 P.2d 340, 344 (Cal. 1941); City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 10 P.2d 745, 748, 750 (Cal. 1932);
Shewbridge v. Police Comm'n of S.F., 149 P.2d 429, 431 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944); People ex rel.
Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 493, 495-96 (1865); Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New
York, 405 N.E.2d 679, 680 (N.Y. 1980); City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd.,
530 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Ohio 1988). But see Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employees v. County of
Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 12-13 (Cal. 1979) ("[B]oth the language of the Constitution and prior authority
support the proposition ... that the determination of the wages paid to employees of charter cities as
well as charter counties is a matter of local rather than state-wide concern."); Prof'l Fire Fighters,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 384 P.2d 158, 166-69 (Cal. 1963); Popper v. Broderick, 56 P. 53, 55
(Cal. 1899) ("We are of opinion that the pay of firemen and policemen clearly falls within the term
'municipal affairs."'). See generally MCBAIN, supra note 7, at 255 n.4; Briffault, Our Localism,
supra note 4, at 16 n.53.
114. See New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 1163-64 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2005).
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always rule that local interests give way to state interests in a general
labor law.' 
1 5
A recent case in California presents an interesting and relatively
rare counter-example. In County of Riverside v. Superior Court,"6 the
California Supreme Court sought to balance the state's interest in uni-
form employment laws with the prerogative of home rule counties to set
salaries for county employees. At issue was whether a state statute
which required stalled labor negotiations to be submitted by a locality to
binding arbitration violated the county's prerogative to set Sheriffs' sala-
ries."l 7 The court answered "yes" and, in upholding local home rule au-
thority in this area, reaffirmed that categorizing and balancing statewide
concerns and local affairs in the area of labor and employment law is the
province of the courts" 18 Notwithstanding County of Riverside, the cate-
gorical preference for statewide labor relations law seems as robust and
well embedded in the strong home rule state of California as elsewhere
nationally. 119
Finally, at least one court has taken care to sort out employment
matters from matters which, while nominally about employment, im-
pinge significantly on the core political structure and organization of
municipalities. 20 In a 1978 case involving certain Oregon cities' chal-
lenge to a state law requiring police and firemen employed by any city to
be members of the state's Public Employees Retirement System, the
Oregon Supreme Court in City of La Grande v. Public Employees Re-
tirement Board upheld the state law.' 2' The court distinguished between
permissible state laws "addressed primarily to substantive social, eco-
nomic, or other regulatory objectives of the state," and more troublesome
state laws addressing "the structure and procedures of local agencies.''
22
The court concluded that:
While the statewide retirement and insurance plans do displace other
plans that local agencies have made, or might make, for these objec-
tives, they are not irreconcilable with the freedom to charter their
own governmental structures that are reserved to the citizens of Asto-
ria and LaGrande by [the state constitution's home rule provision]. 1
23
115. See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 390-91 (noting that although some
state courts "have been particularly protective of local control over the local employment relation-
ship," that "in most states, state law continues to play a major role in regulating the terms of munici-
pal employment").
116. 66 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2003).
117. Id. at 721.
118. Id. at 721, 728.
119. See the cases cited in Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 17 n.54.
120. City of La Grande v. Pub. Employees Ret. Rd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1215 (Or. 1978).
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4. Civil rights laws
The issues with respect to local efforts to protect civil rights in the
face of state laws that seek hegemony over such decisions are difficult
ones that, by and large, have not been settled in the state courts under
constitutional home rule. True, local anti-discrimination ordinances have
frequently been held to be consistent with municipal home rule.' 24 But
the more difficult question of constitutional construction is whether these
laws are immune from displacement by the state. In many of the modem
home rule cases, the state courts manage to reconcile state and local law,
and thereby uphold local civil rights laws, without needing to consider
the question of whether the matter is one of purely local concern.
The most conspicuous and contentious context in which these issues
have arisen is in the context of gay rights. Several state courts have
upheld domestic partner ordinances under home rule, despite the shadow
cast by the state's traditional regulation of marriage and divorce.1 25 More
direct interference by localities with traditional marriage, however, has
not been well received by the courts. In Lockyer v. City & County of San
Francisco,126 for example, the California Supreme Court struck down the
effort of San Francisco's mayor, Gavin Newsom, to issue marriage li-
censes to same-sex couples despite a clearly conflicting state law that
authorized the granting of marriage licenses only to couples comprised of
one man and one woman. 127 The court considered and rejected the pos-
sibility that the issuance of marriage licenses by local officials was a
local affair that fell within the scope of California's broad home rule
provision.
[T]he Legislature has enacted a comprehensive scheme regulating
marriage in California, establishing the substantive standards for eli-
gibility for marriage and setting forth in detail the procedures to be
followed and the public officials who are entrusted with carrying out
these procedures. In light of both the historical understanding reflect-
ed in this statutory scheme and the statutes' repeated emphasis on the
importance of having uniform rules and procedures apply throughout
the state to the subject of marriage, there can be no question but that
marriage is a matter of "statewide concern" rather than a "municipal
124. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 353 (observing that "[s]ome state courts
have upheld local antidiscrimination ordinances that are more expansive than state antidiscrimina-
tion laws" and surveying cases); id. at 354-56 (observing that "[m]ost courts that have considered
[domestic partnership and other measures protecting gays and lesbians against discrimination] have
found that a state's constitutional or statutory grant of home rule power provides local governments
with the authority to adopt them" and surveying cases).
125. See id. at 348-57 (surveying cases); see also Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitution-
al Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 167-77 (2005).
126. 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
127. l at472.
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affair" ... and that state statutes dealing with marriage prevail over
any conflicting local charter provision, ordinance, or practice.
12s
Viewed broadly, conflicts over local civil rights protection and state
regulation are resolved by state courts on a theory of home rule that ap-
pears to privilege local creativity and initiative but, importantly, regards
states as the principal in delineating and shaping civil rights protections.
Ordinarily, states will not endeavor to displace local initiatives by declar-
ing that certain groups are not protected-although there are noteworthy
contrary examples, including the Colorado constitutional initiative struck
down in Romer v. Evans129 in 1996, and California's Proposition 187130
concerning illegal immigration. Rather, states will appeal to a general
law that, they argue, is in conflict with specific local laws. Where the
conflict is unavoidable, states typically win; where the conflict can be
ameliorated with certain judicial constructions, the courts usually find
that local law can rest alongside state law. As local governments contin-
ue to experiment with civil rights protections, we can expect more diffi-
cult home rule cases to come to center stage.
5. Taxing authority
Many conflicts between state and local governments arise in the
area of revenue generation through taxation, and much of the early home
rule caselaw, therefore, concerns such conflicts. 131 Broadly speaking, the
tendency of the courts in this area has been to defer to local judgments.
The basic theory is that two bites at the economic apple are generally
fine. So long as local governments do not make life more difficult for
those who impose and collect state taxes, the courts are inclined to ac-
cord deference to local efforts to generate a revenue base.
A key taxation case is California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
City of Los Angeles132 in which the City of Los Angeles imposed a busi-
ness license tax on all corporations, including commercial banks, doing
business in the jurisdiction. 133 This municipal tax arguably conflicted
with the state's scheme of taxation for financial institutions. In striking
down the local tax, the court deemed the taxation of financial institutions
to be a matter of statewide concern and, therefore, pro tanto, not a mu-
nicipal affair. 34 The principal basis for this holding was that the Cali-
fornia legislature had revealed an interest in imposing a similar, state-
128. See id. at 471.
129. 517 U.S. 620,625 (1996).
130. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1997).
131. See, e.g., Weekes v. City of Oakland, 579 P.2d 449, 573 (Cal. 1978); Ex Parte Braun, 74
P. 780, 780-81, 783-84 (Cal. 1903); Century Plaza Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. Rptr.
166, 167-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 329 P.2d 441,442-43 (Colo.
1958); Angell v. City of Toledo, 91 N.E.2d 250, 251-52 (Ohio 1950).
132. 812 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1991).
133. Id. at 917-18.
134. See id. at 925.
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wide tax, and that Los Angeles's efforts to independently tap this reve-
nue source would undermine the state's program. 135
One troubling aspect of the court's decision is that it presupposes
that claiming goodies for itself and, correspondingly, leaving municipali-
ties out in the cold, is a worthy state interest.1 36 By this logic, state laws
which undermine local fiscal authority more broadly and decisively
would pass muster more easily under the home rule analysis than less
invasive laws. Given the state's obvious incentive in expanding its own
fiscal powers and in disabling competing intrastate institutions, the Cali-
fornia Federal Savings & Loan analysis skews the result squarely in fa-
vor of the state and against the locality.
IV. ASSESSING THE COURTS' HOME RULE DECISIONMAKING
We have seen in Part m the various ways that the state courts have
drawn lines between the state and local spheres of authority. In this Part
we consider whether and to what extent that project has been a success.
Such an assessment, we believe, has implications not only for state con-
stitutionalism and home rule, but also for the appropriate role of the
courts in demarcating and enforcing federal constitutional boundaries of
state regulatory immunity.
The long and rich history of state courts crafting doctrines and
working through, case by case, the adjudicatory problems posed by home
rule provisions in the state constitution stands in stark contrast to the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority1 37 that the courts could not usefully, and should not, play a role
in disputes under the Tenth Amendment 138 concerning the boundaries of
state immunity from federal regulation. The fact that the U.S. Supreme
Court has declared impossible 39 a task that lesser state courts regularly
undertake underscores the importance and value of critically evaluating
the state courts' work. If the state courts are in fact doing a good job, it
would suggest that the task is far from impossible and, indeed, that the
U.S. Supreme Court might do well to follow the state courts' lead. If,
135. See id. at 926-27,
136. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Supremacy, Local Sovereignty: Reconstructing State/Local
Relations under the California Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 401,408-
09 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995).
137. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
138. U.S. Const. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.").
139. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531 (observing that eight years of experience "persuades us
that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional govern-
mental function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of fede-
ralism .... ); id. at 546-47 (rejecting "as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of
state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular
governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional"'); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
880 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that the "essential-function test" is "conceptually
unworkable").
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instead, a close examination causes one to question the quality or feasi-
bility of the state courts' work, then those courts might do well to adopt
the Garcia Court's approach and abandon this particular line-drawing
project.
In order to evaluate the state courts' home rule doctrines and deci-
sions, one must first agree upon a metric or baseline against which to
measure them. This fact is surprisingly often overlooked by commenta-
tors and appellate courts when they engage in such critiques. 4  In addi-
tion, it is important to note that there are two possible focuses of any
evaluation of the work of the courts: the judicially crafted doctrine or
test, and the court's application of that doctrine or test to the facts of in-
dividual cases.
By what standard should one evaluate the state courts' tests for dis-
tinguishing between "local affairs" and "matters of state-wide con-
cern"?141  Should one ask, for example, whether such a test, in the ab-
stract, is coherent? Draws distinctions that are logical? Treats like cases
alike? 142 Is likely to yield predictable results? Or appears to be an effi-
cient means toward a proclaimed policy goal? Similarly, one might ask
by what standard one should judge a state court's application of its home
rule doctrine to the facts of individual cases: Are like cases treated
alike? Are the results predictable? Are plausible justifications given for
the distinctions that are drawn?
We do not propose to resolve these important questions involving
the baselines that should be used in evaluating either aspect of the courts'
work. We raise them largely to underscore the fact that one cannot prop-
erly assess the quality or success of a legal doctrine or judicial decision
140. See, e.g., KRANE, ET AL., supra note 7, at 12 (terming the effort of the courts to sort out
state and local interests "a quixotic quest," but applying no articulated standard when evaluating the
cases). Similarly, George Vaubel has simply concluded, without elaboration, that the cases are
"unpredictable" and "arbitrary":
Many observers lament the need for judicial decision as the greatest weakness of home
rule. Forced to work with vague constitutional language supported only by an imprecise
concept of "local matters," courts rest their decisions upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. The results are unpredictable, if not, at times, arbitrary. Courts, involved in
this impossible, or at least daunting task, equivocate.
George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of Municipal Power in
Home Rule, 20 STETSON L. REv. 5, 39 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
Perhaps the best known example of a court contending that a doctrine is "unworkable" or
inadequate, without articulating a useful baseline against which to measure the cases is the U.S.
Supreme Court in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530 (contending that Nat'l League of Cities doctrine is unac-
ceptable because although the Court "supplied some examples of 'traditional governmental func-
tions,' it did not offer a general explanation of how a 'traditional' function is to be distinguished
from a 'nontraditional' one"); id. at 539 (contending that "this Court has made little headway in
defining the scope of the governmental functions deemed protected under Nat'l League of Cities").
141. See supra Parts III (Introduction) and mlI.A.
142. For a defense of the intriguing proposition that like cases need not be treated alike and that
"[t]he principle 'treat like cases alike' has no independent moral force," see David A. Strauss, Must
Like Cases Be Treated Alike? 2 (Chicago Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 24, May
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=312180.
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in a vacuum or against an unspecified ideal. In the absence of an appro-
priate, agreed-upon metric, we will nonetheless in the remainder of this
Part attempt to evaluate the work of the state courts by closely examining
several criticisms that logically might be levied against the imperio home
rule doctrines that the courts have devised. These criticisms, not surpri-
singly, echo those discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of
its efforts, pursuant to the Tenth Amendment, to protect traditional state
functions, 43 "the functions essential to separate and independent exis-
tence" of the states,"' 44 from federal regulation.
First, one might contend that the doctrines that the courts have
crafted pursuant to the imperio home rule provisions of their states' con-
stitutions are unworkable. The claim is that one cannot distinguish be-
tween matters of "local" or "municipal" concern versus matters of
"statewide" concern with sufficient consistency nor define these terms
with sufficient coherence. 145 This claim must be further parsed, howev-
er. The project of distinguishing between local/municipal and statewide
matters of concern is mandated by the text of many state constitutions'
home rule provisions.146 The Colorado Constitution, for example, autho-
rizes any home rule city to make the laws governing "all its local and
municipal matters," and further stipulates that such local laws "shall su-
persede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or
town any law of the state in conflict therewith."'147 Thus, any perceived
problems with the coherence or "workability" of the larger project, in-
cluding the defining or identifying of such "local and municipal matters,"
are the fault of the drafters and ratifiers of the constitution's home rule
provision rather than of the courts.
If the claim, rather, is that the doctrines that the courts have crafted
to explicate the distinction between local and statewide concerns and to
guide the ensuing line-drawing are not capable of coherent or consistent
143. See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851 (referring to services "which the States
have traditionally afforded their citizens"); id. at 849 ("traditional aspects of state sovereignty"); id.
at 852 (invoking "States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmen-
tal functions"); id. at 854 ("'activities in which the states have traditionally engaged"') (quoting
Unites States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936)).
144. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868) quoted in Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 845; see also Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 581 (1911); Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
851; id. at 855 (referring to the states "choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of
integral governmental functions are to be made").
145. Cf Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530 (contending that Nat'l League of Cities doctrine is unaccepta-
ble because although the Court "supplied some examples of 'traditional governmental functions,' it
did not offer a general explanation of how a 'traditional' function is to be distinguished from a
'nontraditional' one"); id. at 539 (contending that "this Court has made little headway in defining the
scope of the governmental functions deemed protected under Nat'l League of Cities"); id. at 545 ("A
nonhistorical standard for selecting immune governmental functions is likely to be just as unworka-
ble as is a historical standard."); id. at 546-47 (rejecting "as unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether
a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional').
146. See state constitutional provisions cited supra note 12.
147. COLO. CONSr. art. XX, § 6.
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application, then several other questions arise: Against what baseline is
"coherence" or "consistency" in this context usefully measured? How is
a coherent or consistent application of any doctrine to be identified?
What is an example of a judicial doctrine that is capable of the requisite
level of coherence and consistency in its application? In this area, as in
all others in which courts engage in constitutional interpretation, there is
substantial, beneficial doctrinal path dependence that mitigates against
large, abrupt, unexpected changes as a doctrine evolves. Can one ask
more of a system of case-by-case adjudication than that it produce a
roughly consistent and sensible pattern of cases that carry out the larger
objectives of a defensible public policy?
In this regard, it should be noted that no less an authority than New
York's Chief Justice Cardozo affirmed some 80 years ago that drawing
these lines was surely possible, although he did not answer any of the
preceding questions in reaching that conclusion:
[T]he fundamental question to be determined is the line of division
between city and state concerns. In every case, "it is necessary to in-
quire whether a proposed subject of legislation is a matter of State
concern or of local concern." . . . There are some affairs intimately
connected with the exercise by the city of its corporate functions,
which are city affairs only. Illustrations of these I have given, the
laying out of parks, the building of recreations piers, the institution of
public concerts. Many more could be enumerated. Most important
of all, perhaps is the control of the locality over payments from the
local purse .... There are other affairs exclusively those of the state,
such as the law of domestic relations, of wills, of inheritance, of con-
tracts, of crimes not essentially local (for example, larceny or for-
gery), the organization of courts, the procedure therein. None of
these things can be said to touch the affairs that a city is organized to
regulate, whether we have reference to history or to tradition or to the
existing forms of charters.
... A zone, however, exists where state and city concerns overlap
and intermingle....
How great must be the infusion of local interest before fetters are im-
posed [on the power of the Legislature]? ...
Considerations of "more or less" will lead us in such a case, and in
many others, into a morass of indecision. The test is rather this:
That, if the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of state con-
cern, the Legislature may act, though intermingled with it are con-
cerns of the locality.... I assume that, if the affair is partly state and
partly local, the city is free to act until the state has intervened. 
148
148. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713-14 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, CJ., concurring) (citations
omitted).
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One need not simply defer, however, to Chief Justice Cardozo's
implicit assessment that the courts are quite capable of drawing appropri-
ate and principled lines between matters of state and local concern. The
claim that the courts' imperio home rule doctrines are not capable of
coherent or consistent application is problematic in several independent
respects. First, in the absence of an agreed baseline against which vari-
ous doctrines might be measured and compared, there is no reason to
think that judicial linedrawing in this area is any less coherent or consis-
tent than in other doctrinal areas. Second, one implication of concerns
about the coherence or consistency of these doctrines is that the courts
should play no role at all unless they can do so with some (unspecified)
level of jurisprudential purity. The further implication is that judicial
abstinence in this context is preferable to arguably imperfect judicial
review.
Is there support for such a claim? Perhaps judicial review in this
context is not in fact necessary or preferable. What if the state legislature
were simply left to make its own determinations of what matters are of
statewide versus local concern, without judicial oversight or interfe-
rence? In enacting laws, the legislature in an imperio home rule state
could be understood to have made a determination, implicitly or explicit-
ly, that the matter at issue is of statewide concern. If the role of the
courts under imperio home rule provisions is to correct any errors in
these determinations by the legislature, such judicial review would argu-
ably be unnecessary if either there were no legislative errors for the
courts to correct or if the likelihood of subsequent judicial errors were at
least as great as the likelihood of an initial legislative error. We take up
each of these possibilities in turn.
Can the state legislature reasonably be expected not to encroach into
areas of local concern? The argument, analogous to that set out by the
Garcia majority in the federalism context, 149 would be that to the extent
that localities and municipalities are represented in the state legislature,
the state lawmaking process will inevitably and naturally protect their
interests. In fact, however, representation in state legislatures does not
respect the geographic boundaries of municipalities, let alone provide
municipalities any analogue to the representation of states in the U.S.
Senate. Thus, for example, the city of Austin is represented by two
members of the Texas Senate, each of whom represents a portion of the
city, and each of whom also represents various neighboring cities." 0 The
149. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57; see also Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 876-77
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. Texas Senate District 14 includes 84% of the city of Austin, as well as twenty-four other
municipalities in Travis County. Texas Senate District 25 includes the remaining 16% of Austin, as
well as six other municipalities in Travis County and all of the municipalities in each of three neigh-
boring counties (Guadalupe, Hays, and Kendall). See TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, CrTY AND
CENsus DESIGNATED PLACES (CDPs) REPORT BY DISTRICT, SENATE DIsTRICT 14, SENATE
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city of Austin has six Representatives in the Texas House, each of whom
represents a different part of the city, and all but one of whom also
represents some or all of several neighboring municipalities. 151  This
structure of representation can offer no reassurance to those who contend
that municipalities could protect themselves adequately within a state's
political process, in the absence of any judicial review, if each municipal-
ity were represented within that process as a whole and separate munici-
pality. That is, if one's concern, as embodied in imperio home rule pro-
visions of state constitutions, is to ensure that home rule jurisdictions
have a realm of autonomy from state regulation, the existing allocation of
representation gives one no reason to think that the members of the state
legislature will be especially keen to abstain from regulating in areas of
"local concern."
It must be noted, however, that the absence of an analogue to the
U.S. Senate within state legislatures may nonetheless protect localities
from legislative encroachments on their autonomy in a different way.
Since at least 1964, when the U.S. Supreme Court held in Reynolds v.
Sims' 52 that "the Equal Protection Clause requires that both houses of a
state legislature be apportioned on a population basis,' 53 representation
in each house of every state's legislature has been allocated among dis-
tricts of equal population. This means that small and large municipalities
receive equivalent representation, relative to their shares of the state's
population. And this further means that the gains from any legislation
that the state legislature passes are highly likely to be distributed across
municipalities in proportion to their relative shares of the state's popula-
tion.154
This state of affairs differs markedly from that surrounding the U.S.
Senate, which affords large and small states equal representation, without
regard to population. As one of us has demonstrated in previous work,
the disproportionately great representation that the Senate affords small
DISTRICT 25-PLAN 01188S, http://www.fyi.legis.state.tx.us/Info.aspx?rpts=reports (searchable
database requiring input of search terms for specific district).
151. Texas House District 46 includes 18% of the city of Austin, part of one neighboring
municipality, and all of another. House District 47 includes 13% of the city of Austin and all of ten
neighboring municipalities. House District 48 includes 15% of the city of Austin, part of one neigh-
boring municipality, and all of five others. House District 49 includes 21% of the city of Austin.
House District 50 includes 13% of the city of Austin, part of five neighboring municipalities, and all
of two others. House District 51 includes 19% of the city of Austin, part of one neighboring munici-
pality, and all of two others. See TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COuNCIL, CrrY AND CENSUS DESIGNATED
PLACES (CDPs) REPORT BY DISTRICT, HOUSE DISTRICT 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51-PLAN 01368H,
http://www.fyi.legis.state.tx.us/Info.aspx?rpts=reports (searchable database requiring input of search
terms for specific district).
152. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
153. Id. at 583.
154. See Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has
Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 37 (1997); see also Baker, Spending Power, supra note 49, at 203-04;
Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons from the Spending Power, 103
NW. U.L. REv. 495, 525 (2009) [hereinafter Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities].
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population states, relative to their shares of the nation's population, re-
sults in small population states wielding disproportionately great power
in Congress as a whole. 55 This in turn can be shown, both theoretically
and empirically, to result in small states receiving a disproportionately
large slice, and large states a disproportionately small slice, of the federal
"pie.' ' 56 This systematic redistribution of wealth from the larger states to
the smaller ones cannot be explained by systematically greater poverty in
the smaller states, nor can it be justified by any moral or economic
theory.157 In sum, the equal representation afforded states by the Senate
systematically encroaches on the autonomy of the larger population
states, to the benefit of the smaller states.
The thoroughly proportional structure of representation in state leg-
islatures, combined with the absence of municipality-based representa-
tion, means that a subset of cities within a state are unlikely to be able
systematically to harness the state lawmaking power to infringe on the
autonomy of other cities.158 At the same time, however, the absence of
municipality-based representation may give the state legislature no par-
ticular reason to respect, and to refrain from legislating in, areas of "local
concern." In sum, the structure of representation within the state legisla-
ture, taken alone, does not provide a persuasive argument that the state
legislature can reasonably be expected not to encroach into areas of local
concern.
If state legislatures cannot be presumed consistently to "get right"
the divide between matters of local versus statewide concern, the ques-
tion then becomes whether the addition of judicial review will reduce or
increase the rate of errors in this area. In essence, the question is one of
comparative institutional competence between state courts and state leg-
islatures in the area of ensuring constitutionally mandated local autono-
my.
At one level, this inquiry simply returns us to a variant of the ques-
tions with which we began: by what baseline or metric should one
measure the competence of the court in this area? And what is the pur-
pose of constitutional home rule provisions? If one looks beyond these
questions to potentially relevant differences between courts and legisla-
tures, however, it seems likely that judicial review will reduce rather than
increase the rate of errors in identifying areas of local concern. Judicial
155. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 155, at 26-29; Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities, supra
note 165, at 528-29.
156. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 155, at 36-41; Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities, supra
note 165, at 525-36; Baker, Spending Power, supra note 49, at 203-12.
157. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 155, at 41-42; Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities, supra
note 165, at 535; Baker, Spending Power, supra note 48, at 211.
158. Other provisions of state constitutions, most notably prohibitions on special legislation,
may prevent this as well. See, e.g., BAKER & GI.LETrE, supra note 14, at 224-43 (discussing and
presenting cases involving prohibitions on "special" and "local" legislation).
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norms can be expected to cause the courts to strive for continuity over
time in deciding what is or is not a matter of local concern. Although
this respect for precedent might be construed as resulting in "regressive"
or "backward looking" decisions, it means that there is likely to be a pre-
dictability to those decisions. Appellate courts, especially, are likely to
be attentive to the temporal "big picture" in a particular doctrinal area.
The legislature, by contrast, operates under very different norms. The
preferences of current interest groups and constituencies are likely to
substantially affect legislative outcomes. In sum, as compared to the
legislature, the courts seem to have relatively little incentive to be biased
in their decisionmaking in favor of any particular interest group or con-
stituency, and to be relatively more likely to be impartially concerned
with the larger, theoretical question of what is a matter of local concern.
Finally, without regard to the persuasiveness of the above, some
might contend that there is no reason for the courts to review legislation
under the state constitution's home rule provision because the courts are
also reviewing legislation under a variety of other constitutional provi-
sions designed to reign in plenary legislative power. Such provisions
include prohibitions against special and local legislation, prohibitions on
special commissions, and "public purpose" requirements for the issuance
of debt and the spending of public funds. 159 Although the effect of some
of these provisions in particular instances may be to prevent legislative
encroachments on local autonomy, none of these other provisions has
that as its focus. Consistent with that fact, at the time of their adoption,
imperio home rule provisions were quite obviously not considered to be
redundant with concurrently adopted or pre-existing constitutional con-
straints on plenary legislative power.
160
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have undertaken a preliminary critical examina-
tion of the role of the courts under imperio home rule provisions of state
constitutions. We have set out a framework for understanding what it is
159. See, e.g., BAKER & GILLErrE, supra note 14, at 222-43 (discussing and presenting cases
involving prohibitions on special and local legislation); id. at 213-22 (discussing and presenting
cases involving prohibitions on special commissions); id. at 393-448 (discussing and presenting
cases involving constitutional requirements for the issuance of debt and the spending of public
funds).
160. The first state to adopt imperio home rule was Missouri in its 1875 Constitution. The
home rule provision granted only the city of St. Louis a power of initiative, which was required to be
exercised "in harmony with and subject to the Constitution and laws" of Missouri. Mo. CONST. art.
IV, §§ 20-22 (1875). Importantly, however, the 1875 Constitution also included a prohibition on
special and local laws. Id. art. IX, §§ 20-25. See also Libonati, supra note 22, at 109-24. In 1851,
Indiana was the first state to include in its constitution a provision prohibiting local or special legis-
lation. Id. at 122-23. And in 1872, Pennsylvania adopted a "ripper clause" constitutional provision
limiting the power of the legislature to delegate municipal functions to a "special commission." Id.
at 123. Many states went on to adopt both of these types of provisions, as well as imperio home
rule. See, e.g., id. at 114; KRANE ET AL., supra note 7, at 10-12; REYNOLDS, JR., supra note 14, at
90-114.
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that state courts are doing when they review legislation that is challenged
under these provisions, and have discussed in detail the courts' handling
of a number of home rule disputes. We have then undertaken to assess
the extent to which the attempts of the state courts to draw lines between
the state and local spheres of authority has been a success. Our tentative
conclusion is that the state courts do have a significant role to play in
ensuring the local autonomy mandated by constitutional home rule, and
that there is no compelling reason to declare this doctrinal project a fail-
ure, let alone one requiring judicial abdication.
In future work, we intend to investigate more elaborately, and with
greater attention to political and structural considerations, the relation-
ship between constitutional design, constitutional law, and the respective
roles of the federal and state judiciaries. In particular, we hope to com-
pare and contrast more fully the role of the state courts under imperio
home rule and the role of the federal courts when considering federalism
claims under the Tenth Amendment. Such a thoroughgoing positive
analysis, we believe, has important implications for both the federal and
state courts.
To the extent that the results of the preliminary analysis in this Ar-
ticle are borne out in future work, it may provide reassurance to the state
courts that their attempts to police the boundaries between cities and
states in home rule jurisdictions are important and should continue, not-
withstanding the contrary jurisprudential claims of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Garcia.161 And, to the extent that the Court's decisions in New
York, 162 Lopez, 163 and Printz'64 suggest that it has begun a retreat from its
declaration of nonjusticiability in Garcia,65 our work may offer reason
161. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
162. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-77 (1992) (invalidating a federal
environmental regulation deemed to 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal
regulatory purposes" and therefore to be "inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority
between federal and state goverments"); id. at 201-07 (White, J., dissenting) (questioning whether
majority's decision in New York could be reconciled with Garcia).
163. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (identifying family law, criminal
law enforcement, and education as areas "where States historically have been sovereign"); id. at 624
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Commerce Clause does not permit the federal government
"to regulate 'marriage, divorce, and child custody,' or to regulate any and all aspects of education").
164. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding Brady Act unconsti-
tutional on grounds that "the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory programs"); cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding under Eleventh
Amendment that Congress lacks authority to empower private citizens to sue states for damages in
state court without the states' consent).
165. Cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding under Eleventh Amendment that Con-
gress lacks authority to empower private citizens to sue states for damages in state court without the
states' consent). Scholars disagree about the extent to which Garcia is still good law, though all
agree that the Court has retreated from its position in Garcia that the courts have no role to play in
delimiting or enforcing the federal-state divide. Compare, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safe-
guards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311,1311-12 (1997) (contending that Garcia is no longer
"good law" nor "the controlling theory concerning judicial review of federalism questions"), and id.
at 1334-35 (acknowledging that "the Court has yet to explicitly override Garcia," but contending
that both the then-current majority on the Court as well as the dissenters "have acquiesced in the
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for optimism that the federal courts can and should play a useful role in
policing the federal/state divide.
overruling of Garcia" in cases beginning with Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)), with Jay
S. Bybee, The Tenth Amendment Among the Shadows: On Reading the Constitution in Plato's Cave,
23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551, 561 (2000) (describing New York, Printz, and Alden as "cases that
chip away at," rather than overrule, Garcia). See also Thomas H. Odom, Foreword: An Introduction
to the Symposium on the Federalism Decisions of the Supreme Court's 1999 Term, 25 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REv. 783, 810-11 (2000) (observing that New York and Printz may be understood either "to
effectively overrule Garcia" or "to create an 'anti-commandeering' exception to Garcia").
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HoME RULE PROVISIONS IN THE STATES IN 2009
State Type of Citation Home Rule Provision
Home Rule
I Alabama
2 Alaska Legislative Alaska Const. Section 11. Home Rule Powers
art. X, § 11
(2009) A home rule borough or city may exercise all
legislative powers not prohibited by law or by
charter.
3 Arizona Legislative Ariz. Const. § 2. Charter; preparation and proposal by board of
art. XIII, §§ 2 freeholders; ratification and approval; amendment
& 3 (2008).
Section 2. Any city containing, now or hereafter, a
population of more than three thousand five hun-
dred may frame a charter for its own government
consistent with, and subject to, the Constitution and
the laws of the State, in the following manner: A
board of freeholders composed of fourteen quali-
fied electors of said city may be elected at large by
the qualified electors thereof, at a general or special
election, whose duty it shall be, within ninety days
after such election, to prepare and propose a charter
for such city. Such proposed charter shall be signed
in duplicate by the members of such board, or a
majority of them, and filed, one copy of said
proposed charter with the chief executive officer of
such city and the other with the county recorder of
the county in which said city shall be situated. Such
proposed charter shall then be published in one or
more newspapers published, and of general circula-
tion, within said city for at least twenty-one days if
in a daily paper, or in three consecutive issues if in
a weekly paper, and the first publication shall be
made within twenty days after the completion of
the proposed charter. Within thirty days, and not
earlier than twenty days, after such publication,
said proposed charter shall be submitted to the vote
of the qualified electors of said city at a general or
special election. If a majority of such qualified
electors voting thereon shall ratify such proposed
charter, it shall thereupon be submitted to the
Governor for his approval, and the Governor shall
approve it if it shall not be in conflict with this
Constitution or with the laws of the State. Upon
such approval said charter shall become the organic
law of such city and supersede any charter then
existing (and all amendments thereto), and all
ordinances inconsistent with said new charter. A
copy of such charter, certified by the chief execu-
tive officer, and authenticated by the seal, of such
_ city, together with a statement similarly certified
* The authors are grateful to George Hinchey, Univ. of Texas School of Law Class of 2009,
who did the bulk of the research necessary for preparing this appendix.
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and authenticated setting forth the submission of
such charter to the electors and its ratification by
them, shall, after the approval of such charter by
the Governor, be made in duplicate and filed, one
copy in the office of the Secretary of State and the
other in the archives of the city after being recorded
in the office of said County Recorder. Thereafter all
courts shall take judicial notice of said charter.
The charter so ratified may be amended by amend-
ments proposed and submitted by the legislative
authority of the city to the qualified electors thereof
(or by petition as hereinafter provided), at a general
or special election, and ratified by a majority of the
qualified electors voting thereon and approved by
the Governor as herein provided for the approval of
the charter.
§ 3. Election of board of freeholders
Section 3. An election of such board of freeholders
may be called at any time by the legislative author-
ity of any such city. Such election shall be called by
the chief executive officer of any such city within
ten days after there shall have been filed with him a
petition demanding such election, signed by a
number of qualified electors residing within such
city equal to twenty-five per centum of the total
number of votes cast at the next preceding general
municipal election. Such election shall be held not
later than thirty days after the call therefore. At
such election a vote shall be taken upon the ques-
tion whether further proceedings toward adopting a
charter shall be had in pursuance to the call, and
unless a majority of the qualified electors voting
thereon shall vote to proceed further, no further
proceedings shall be had, and all proceedings up to
the time of said election shall be of no effect.
4 Arkansas Imperio A.C.A. § 14- 14-42-307. Powers of municipalities.
42-307 (2008) (a) (1) Each municipality operating under a charter
A.C.A. § 14- shall have the authority to exercise all powers
43-602 (2008) relating to municipal affairs.
(2) This grant of authority shall not be deemed to
limit or restrict the powers of the General Assembly
in matters of state affairs, nor shall this subchapter
be construed as increasing or diminishing the
powers of the state to regulate utilities not munici-
pally owned or fix the rates thereof.
(b) The following shall be deemed to be a part of
the powers conferred upon the municipalities by
this subchapter:
(1) To levy, assess, and collect taxes within the
limits prescribed in the charter adopted by the
municipality and the limits prescribed in the Arkan-
sas Constitution;
(2) To furnish all local public services; to acquire
property therefor by condemnation or otherwise,
within or without the corporate limits, subject,
however, to the provisions of the general laws of
the State of Arkansas, including any law requiring
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that the acquisition of a utility plant be approved by
a municipal election. However, no property can be
acquired under this subchapter by the issuance of
bonds, notes, or other evidence of indebtedness
unless the bonds, notes, or evidence of indebted-
ness is secured by the credit of the city and all the
property therein;
(3) To exercise all powers conferred by the state
constitution and the General Assembly generally
upon municipalities not contrary to this subchapter.
(c) No municipality shall pass any laws contrary to
the criminal laws of the State of Arkansas.
14-43-602. Authority generally.
Any city of the frst class is authorized to perform
any function and exercise full legislative power in
any and all matters of whatsoever nature pertaining
to its municipal affairs including, but not limited to,
the power to tax.
5 California Imperio Cal Const, § 3. County and city charters
Art. x§§
3(a), 4(g), 5 & (a) For its own government, a county or city may
6(2008). adopt a charter by majority vote of its electors
voting on the question. The charter is effective
when filed with the Secretary of State. A charter
may be amended, revised, or repealed in the same
manner. A charter, amendment, revision, or repeal
thereof shall be published in the official state
statutes. County charters adopted pursuant to this
section shall supersede any existing charter and all
laws inconsistent therewith. The provisions of a
charter are the law of the State and have the force
and effect of legislative enactments.
§ 4. County charter provisions
County charters shall provide for:
(g) Whenever any county has framed and adopted a
charter, and the same shall have been approved by
the Legislature as herein provided, the general laws
adopted by the Legislature in pursuance of Section
1 (b) of this article, shall, as to such county, be
superseded by said charter as to matters for which,
under this section it is competent to make provision
in such charter, and for which provision is made
therein, except as herein otherwise expressly
provided.
§ 5. City charter provisions
(a) It shall be competent in any city charter to
provide that the city governed thereunder may
make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in
respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restric-
tions and limitations provided in their several
charters and in respect to other matters they shall be
subject to general laws. City charters adopted
pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any
existing charter, and with respect to municipal
affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent
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therewith.
(b) It shall be competent in all city charters to
provide, in addition to those provisions allowable
by this Constitution, and by the laws of the State
for: (1) the constitution, regulation, and government
of the city police force (2) subgovemment in all or
part of a city (3) conduct of city elections and (4)
plenary authority is hereby granted, subject only to
the restrictions of this article, to provide therein or
by amendment thereto, the manner in which, the
method by which, the times at which, and the terms
for which the several municipal officers and em-
ployees whose compensation is paid by the city
shall be elected or appointed, and for their removal,
and for their compensation, and for the number of
deputies, clerks and other employees that each shall
have, and for the compensation, method of ap-
pointment, qualifications, tenure of office and
removal of such deputies, clerks and other employ-
ees.
§ 6. Consolidation as charter city and county
(a) A county and all cities within it may consolidate
as a charter city and county as provided by statute.
(b) A charter city and county is a charter city and a
charter county. Its charter city powers supersede
conflicting charter county powers.
6 Colorado Imperio Colo. Const. Section 6. Home rule for cities and towns
Art. XX, § 6
(2008). The people of each city or town of this state,
having a population of two thousand inhabitants as
determined by the last preceding census taken
under the authority of the United States, the state of
Colorado or said city or town, are hereby vested
with, and they shall always have, power to make,
amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or
town, which shall be its organic law and extend to
all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant
thereto in such matters shall supersede within the
territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city
or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.
Proposals for charter conventions shall be submit-
ted by the city council or board of trustees, or other
body in which the legislative powers of the city or
town shall then be vested, at special elections, or at
general, state or municipal elections, upon petition
filed by qualified electors, all in reasonable con-
formity with section 5 of this article, and all pro-
ceedings thereon or thereafter shall be in reasonable
conformity with sections 4 and 5 of this article.
From and after the certifying to and filing with the
secretary of state of a charter framed and approved
in reasonable conformity with the provisions of this
article, such city or town, and the citizens thereof,
shall have the powers set out in sections 1, 4 and 5
of this article, and all other powers necessary,
requisite or proper for the government and admini-
stration of its local and municipal matters, includ-
ing power to legislate upon, provide, regulate.
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conduct and control:
a. The creation and terms of municipal officers,
agencies and employments; the definition, regula-
tion and alteration of the powers, duties, qualifica-
tions and terms or tenure of all municipal officers,
agents and employees;
b. The creation of police courts; the definition and
regulation of the jurisdiction, powers and duties
thereof, and the election or appointment of police
magistrates therefor;
c. The creation of municipal courts; the definition
and regulation of the jurisdiction, powers and duties
thereof, and the election or appointment of the
officers thereof;
d. All matters pertaining to municipal elections in
such city or town, and to electoral votes therein on
measures submitted under the charter or ordinances
thereof, including the calling or notice and the date
of such election or vote, the registration of voters,
nominations, nomination and election systems,
judges and clerks of election, the form of ballots,
balloting, challenging, canvassing, certifying the
result, securing the purity of elections, guarding
against abuses of the elective franchise, and tending
to make such elections or electoral votes non-
partisan in character;
e. The issuance, refunding and liquidation of all
kinds of municipal obligations, including bonds and
other obligations of park, water and local improve-
ment districts;
f. The consolidation and management of park or
water districts in such cities or towns or within the
jurisdiction thereof; but no such consolidation shall
be effective until approved by the vote of a major-
ity, in each district to be consolidated, of the
qualified electors voting therein upon the question;
g. The assessment of property in such city or town
for municipal taxation and the levy and collection
of taxes thereon for municipal purposes and special
assessments for local improvements; such assess-
ments, levy and collection of taxes and special
assessments to be made by municipal officials or by
the county or state officials as may be provided by
the charter;
h. The imposition, enforcement and collection of
fines and penalties for the violation of any of the
provisions of the charter, or of any ordinance
adopted in pursuance of the charter.
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm
to the people of all municipalities coming within its
provisions the full right of self-government in both
local and municipal matters and the enumeration
herein of certain powers shall not be construed to
deny such cities and towns, and to the people
thereof, any right or power essential or proper to
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the full exercise of such right.
The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as
applicable, shall continue to apply to such cities
and towns, except insofar as superseded by the
charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance
passed pursuant to such charters.
All provisions of the charters of the city and county
of Denver and the cities of Pueblo, Colorado
Springs and Grand Junction, as heretofore certified
to and filed with the secretary of state, and of the
charter of any other city heretofore approved by a
majority of those voting thereon and certified to
and filed with the secretary of state, which provi-
sions are not in conflict with this article, and all
elections and electoral votes heretofore had under
and pursuant thereto, are hereby ratified, affirmed
and validated as of their date.
Any act in violation of the provisions of such
charter or of any ordinance thereunder shall be
criminal and punishable as such when so provided
by any statute now or hereafter in force.
The provisions of this section 6 shall apply to the
city and county of Denver.
This article shall be in all respects self-executing.
7 Connecticut Imperio Conn. Gen. Sec. 7-148. Scope of municipal powers
Stat. § 7-148
(2008). (a) Definitions. Whenever used in this section,
"municipality" means any town, city or borough,
consolidated town and city or consolidated town
and borough.
(b) Ordinances. Powers granted to any municipality
under the general statutes or by any charter or
special act, unless the charter or special act pro-
vides to the contrary, shall be exercised by ordi-
nance when the exercise of such powers has the
effect of:
(1) Establishing rules or regulations of general
municipal application, the violation of which may
result in the imposition of a fine or other penalty
including community service for not more than
twenty hours; or
(2) Creating a permanent local law of general
applicability.
(c) Powers. Any municipality shall have the power
to do any of the following, in addition to all powers
granted to municipalities under the Constitution and
general statutes:
(1) Corporate powers. (A) Contract and be con-
tracted with, sue and be sued, and institute, prose-
cute, maintain and defend any action or proceeding
in any court of competent jurisdiction;
(B) Provide for the authentication, execution and
delivery of deeds, contracts, grants, and releases of
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municipal property and for the issuance of evi-
dences of indebtedness of the municipality;
(2) Finances and appropriations. (A) Establish and
maintain a budget system;
(B) Assess, levy and collect taxes for general or
special purposes on all property, subjects or objects
which may be lawfully taxed, and regulate the
mode of assessment and collection of taxes and
assessments not otherwise provided for, including
establishment of a procedure for the withholding of
approval of building application when taxes or
water or sewer rates, charges or assessments
imposed by the municipality are delinquent for the
property for which an application was made;
(C) Make appropriations for the support of the
municipality and pay its debts;
(D) Make appropriations for the purpose of meeting
a public emergency threatening the lives, health or
property of citizens, provided such appropriations
shall require a favorable vote of at least two-thirds
of the entire membership of the legislative body or,
when the legislative body is the town meeting, at
least two-thirds of those present and voting;
(E) Make appropriations to military organizations,
hospitals, health care facilities, public health
nursing organizations, nonprofit museums and
libraries, organizations providing drug abuse and
dependency programs and any other private organi-
zation performing a public function;
(F) Provide for the manner in which contracts
involving unusual expenditures shall be made;
(G) When not specifically prescribed by general
statute or by charter, prescribe the form of proceed-
ings and mode of assessing benefits and appraising
damages in taking land for public use, or in making
public improvements to be paid for, in whole or in
part, by special assessments, and prescribe the
manner in which all benefits assessed shall be
collected;
(H) Provide for the bonding of municipal officials
or employees by requiring the furnishing of such
bond, conditioned upon honesty or faithful per-
formance of duty and determine the amount, form,
and sufficiency of the sureties thereof;
(1) Regulate the method of borrowing money for
any purpose for which taxes may be levied and
borrow on the faith and credit of the municipality
for such general or special purposes and to such
extent as is authorized by general statute;
(J) Provide for the temporary borrowing of money;
(K) Create a sinking fund or funds or a trust fund or
funds or other special funds, including funds which
do not lapse at the end of the municipal fiscal year,
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(L) Provide for the assignment of municipal tax
liens on real property to the extent authorized by
general statute;
(3) Property. (A) Take or acquire by gift, purchase,
grant, including any grant from the United States or
the state, bequest or devise and hold, condemn,
lease, sell, manage, transfer, release and convey
such real and personal property or interest therein
absolutely or in trust as the purposes of the munici-
pality or any public use or purpose, including that
of education, art, ornament, health, charity or
amusement, cemeteries, parks or gardens, or the
erection or maintenance of statues, monuments,
buildings or other structures, require. Any lease of
real or personal property or any interest therein,
either as lessee or lessor, may be for such term or
any extensions thereof and upon such other terms
and conditions as have been approved by the
municipality, including without limitation the
power to bind itself to appropriate funds as neces-
sary to meet rent and other obligations as provided
in any such lease;
(B) Provide for the proper administration of gifts,
grants, bequests and devises and meet such terms or
conditions as are prescribed by the grantor or donor
and accepted by the municipality;
(4) Public services. (A) Provide for police protec-
tion, regulate and prescribe the duties of the per-
sons providing police protection with respect to
criminal matters within the limits of the municipal-
ity and maintain and regulate a suitable place of
detention within the limits of the municipality for
the safekeeping of all persons arrested and awaiting
trial and do all other things necessary or desirable
for the policing of the municipality;
(B) Provide for fire protection, organize, maintain
and regulate the persons providing fire protection,
provide the necessary apparatus for extinguishing
fires and do all other things necessary or desirable
for the protection of the municipality from fire;
(C) Provide for entertainment, amusements, con-
certs, celebrations and cultural activities, including
the direct or indirect purchase, ownership and
operation of the assets of one or more sports
franchises;
(D) Provide for ambulance service by the munici-
pality or any person, firm or corporation;
(E) Provide for the employment of nurses;
(F) Provide for lighting the streets, highways and
other public places of the municipality and for the
care and preservation of public lamps, lamp posts
and fixtures;
(G) Provide for the furnishing of water, by contract
or otherwise;
(H) Provide for or regulate the collection and
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disposal of garbage, trash, rubbish, waste material
and ashes by contract or otherwise, including
prohibiting the throwing or placing of such materi-
als on the highways;
(1) Provide for the financing, construction, rehabili-
tation, repair, improvement or subsidization of
housing for low and moderate income persons and
families;
(5) Personnel. (A) Provide for and establish pension
systems for the officers and employees of the
municipality and for the active members of any
volunteer fire department or any volunteer ambu-
lance association of the municipality, and establish
a system of qualification for the tenure in office of
such officers and employees, provided the rights or
benefits granted to any individual under any mu-
nicipal retirement or pension system shall not be
diminished or eliminated;
(B) Establish a merit system or civil service system
for the selection and promotion of public officials
and employees. Nothing in this subparagraph shall
be construed to validate any merit system or civil
service system established prior to May 24, 1972;
(C) Provide for the employment of and prescribe
the salaries, compensation and hours of employ-
ment of all officers and employees of the munici-
pality and the duties of such officers and employees
not expressly defined by the Constitution of the
state, the general statutes, charter or special act;
(D) Provide for the appointment of a municipal
historian;
(6) Public works, sewers, highways. (A) Public
facilities. (i) Establish, lay out, construct, recon-
struct, alter, maintain, repair, control and operate
cemeteries, public burial grounds, hospitals, clinics,
institutions for children and aged, infirm and
chronically ill persons, bus terminals and airports
and their accessories, docks, wharves, school
houses, libraries, parks, playgrounds, playfields,
fieldhouses, baths, bathhouses, swimming pools,
gymnasiums, comfort stations, recreation places,
public beaches, beach facilities, public gardens,
markets, garbage and refuse disposal facilities,
parking lots and other off-street parking facilities,
and any and all buildings or facilities necessary or
convenient for carrying on the government of the
municipality;
(ii) Create, provide for, construct, regulate and
maintain all things in the nature of public works
and improvements;
(iii) Enter into or upon any land for the purpose of
making necessary surveys or mapping in connec-
tion with any public improvement, and take by
eminent domain any lands, rights, easements,
privileges, franchises or structures which are
necessary for the purpose of establishing, construct-
ing or maintaining any public work, or for any
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municipal purpose, in the manner prescribed by the
general statutes;
(iv) Regulate and protect from injury or defacement
all public buildings, public monuments, trees and
ornaments in public places and other public prop-
erty in the municipality;
(v) Provide for the planting, rearing and preserving
of shade and ornamental trees on the streets and
public grounds;
(vi) Provide for improvement of waterfronts by a
board, commission or otherwise;
(B) Sewers, drainage and public utilities. (i) Lay
out, construct, reconstruct, repair, maintain, oper-
ate, alter, extend and discontinue sewer and drain-
age systems and sewage disposal plants;
(ii) Enter into or upon any land for the purpose of
correcting the flow of surface water through water-
courses which prevent, or may tend to prevent, the
free discharge of municipal highway surface water
through said courses;
(iii) Regulate the laying, location and maintenance
of gas pipes, water pipes, drains, sewers, poles,
wires, conduits and other structures in the streets
and public places of the municipality;
(iv) Prohibit and regulate the discharge of drains
from roofs of buildings over or upon the sidewalks,
streets or other public places of the municipality or
into sanitary sewers;
(C) Highways and sidewalks. (i) Lay out, construct,
reconstruct, alter, maintain, repair, control, operate,
and assign numbers to streets, alleys, highways,
boulevards, bridges, underpasses, sidewalks, curbs,
gutters, public walks and parkways;
(ii) Keep open and safe for public use and travel
and free from encroachment or obstruction the
streets, sidewalks and public places in the munici-
pality;
(iii) Control the excavation of highways and streets;
(iv) Regulate and prohibit the excavation, altering
or opening of sidewalks, public places and grounds
for public and private purposes and the location of
any work or things thereon, whether temporary or
permanent, upon or under the surface thereof;
(v) Require owners or occupants of land adjacent to
any sidewalk or public work to remove snow, ice,
sleet, debris or any other obstruction therefrom,
provide penalties upon their failure to do so, and
cause such snow, ice, sleet, debris or other obstruc-
tion to be removed and make the cost of such
removal a lien on such property;
(vi) Grant to abutting property owners a limited
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property or leasehold interest in abutting streets and
sidewalks for the purpose of encouraging and
supporting private commercial development;
(7) Regulatory and police powers. (A) Buildings.
(i) Make rules relating to the maintenance of safe
and sanitary housing;
(ii) Regulate the mode of using any buildings when
such regulations seem expedient for the purpose of
promoting the safety, health, morals and general
welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality;
(iii) Regulate and prohibit the moving of buildings
upon or through the streets or other public places of
the municipality, and cause the removal and demo-
lition of unsafe buildings and structures;
(iv) Regulate and provide for the licensing of
parked trailers when located off the public high-
ways, and trailer parks or mobile manufactured
home parks, except as otherwise provided by
special act and except where there exists a local
zoning commission so empowered;
(v) Establish lines beyond which no buildings,
steps, stoop, veranda, billboard, advertising sign or
device or other structure or obstruction may be
erected;
(vi) Regulate and prohibit the placing, erecting or
keeping of signs, awnings or other things upon or
over the sidewalks, streets and other public places
of the municipality;
(vii) Regulate plumbing and house drainage;
(viii) Prohibit or regulate the construction of
dwellings, apartments, boarding houses, hotels,
commercial buildings, youth camps or commercial
camps and commercial camping facilities in such
municipality unless the sewerage facilities have
been approved by the authorized officials of the
municipality;
(B) Traffic. (i) Regulate and prohibit, in a manner
not inconsistent with the general statutes, traffic,
the operation of vehicles on streets and highways,
off-street parking and on-street residential
neighborhood parking areas in which on-street
parking is limited to residents of a given neighbor-
hood, as determined by the municipality;
(ii) Regulate the speed of vehicles, subject to the
provisions of the general statutes relating to the
regulation of the speed of motor vehicles and of
animals, and the driving or leading of animals
through the streets;
(C) Building adjuncts. Regulate and prohibit the
construction or use, and require the removal of
sinks, cesspools, drains, sewers, privies, barns,
outhouses and poultry pens and houses;
(D) Animals. (i) Regulate and prohibit the going at
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large of dogs and other animals in the streets and
public places of the municipality and prevent
cruelty to animals and all inhuman sports;
(ii) Regulate and prohibit the keeping of wild or
domestic animals, including reptiles, within the
municipal limits or portions thereof;
(E) Nuisance. Define, prohibit and abate within the
municipality all nuisances and causes thereof, and
all things detrimental to the health, morals, safety,
convenience and welfare of its inhabitants and
cause the abatement of any nuisance at the expense
of the owner or owners of the premises on which
such nuisance exists;
(F) Loitering and trespassing. (i) Keep streets,
sidewalks and public places free from undue noise
and nuisances, and prohibit loitering thereon;
(ii) Regulate loitering on private property with the
permission of the owner thereof;
(iii) Prohibit the loitering in the nighttime of minors
on the streets, alleys or public places within its
limits;
(iv) Prevent trespassing on public and private lands
and in buildings in the municipality;
(G) Vice. Prevent vice and suppress gambling
houses, houses of ill-fame and disorderly houses;
(H) Public health and safety. (i) Secure the safety of
persons in or passing through the municipality by
regulation of shows, processions, parades and
music;
(ii) Regulate and prohibit the carrying on within the
municipality of any trade, manufacture, business or
profession which is, or may be, so carried on as to
become prejudicial to public health, conducive to
fraud and cheating, or dangerous to, or constituting
an unreasonable annoyance to, those living or
owning property in the vicinity;
(iii) Regulate auctions and garage and tag sales;
(iv) Prohibit, restrain, license and regulate the
business of peddlers, auctioneers and junk dealers
in a manner not inconsistent with the general
statutes;
(v) Regulate and prohibit swimming or bathing in
the public or exposed places within the municipal-
ity;
(vi) Regulate and license the operation of amuse-
ment parks and amusement arcades including, but
not limited to, the regulation of mechanical rides
and the establishment of the hours of operation;
(vii) Prohibit, restrain, license and regulate all
sports, exhibitions, public amusements and per-
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formances and all places where games may be
played;
(viii) Preserve the public peace and good order,
prevent and quell riots and disorderly assemblages
and prevent disturbing noises;
(ix) Establish a system to obtain a more accurate
registration of births, marriages and deaths than the
system provided by the general statutes in a manner
not inconsistent with the general statutes;
(x) Control insect pests or plant diseases in any
manner deemed appropriate;
(xi) Provide for the health of the inhabitants of the
municipality and do all things necessary or desir-
able to secure and promote the public health;
(xii) Regulate the use of streets, sidewalks, high-
ways, public places and grounds for public and
private purposes;
(xiii) Make and enforce police, sanitary or other
similar regulations and protect or promote the
peace, safety, good government and welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants;
(xiv) Regulate, in addition to the requirements
under section 7-282b, the installation, maintenance
and operation of any device or equipment in a
residence or place of business which is capable of
automatically calling and relaying recorded emer-
gency messages to any state police or municipal
police or fire department telephone number or
which is capable of automatically calling and
relaying recorded emergency messages or other
forms of emergency signals to an intermediate third
party which shall thereafter call and relay such
emergency messages to a state police or municipal
police or fire department telephone number. Such
regulations may provide for penalties for the
transmittal of false alarms by such devices or
equipment;
(xv) Make and enforce regulations preventing
housing blight, including regulations reducing
assessments, provided such regulations define
housing blight, and including regulations establish-
ing a duty to maintain property and specifying
standards to determine if there is neglect; prescribe
fines for the violation of such regulations of not
less than ten or more than one hundred dollars for
each day that a violation continues and, if such
fines are prescribed, such municipality shall adopt a
citation hearing procedure in accordance with
section 7-152c;
(8) The environmenL (A) Provide for the protection
and improvement of the environment including, but
not limited to, coastal areas, wetlands and areas
adjacent to waterways in a manner not inconsistent
with the general statutes;
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(B) Regulate the location and removal of any
offensive manure or other substance or dead
animals through the streets of the municipality and
provide for the disposal of same;
(C) Except where there exists a local zoning com-
mission, regulate the filling of, or removal of, soil,
loam, sand or gravel from land not in public use in
the whole, or in specified districts of, the munici-
pality, and provide for the reestablishment of
ground level and protection of the area by suitable
cover;
(D) Regulate the emission of smoke from any
chimney, smokestack or other source within the
limits of the municipality, and provide for proper
heating of buildings within the municipality;
(9) Human rights. (A) Provide for fair housing;
(B) Adopt a code of prohibited discriminatory
practices;
(10) Miscellaneous. (A) Make all lawful regula-
tions and ordinances in furtherance of any general
powers as enumerated in this section, and prescribe
penalties for the violation of the same not to exceed
two hundred fifty dollars, unless otherwise specifi-
cally provided by the general statutes. Such regula-
tions and ordinances may be enforced by citations
issued by designated municipal officers or employ-
ees, provided the regulations and ordinances have
been designated specifically by the municipality for
enforcement by citation in the same manner in
which they were adopted and the designated
municipal officers or employees issue a written
warning providing notice of the specific violation
before issuing the citation;
(B) Adopt a code of ethical conduct;
(C) Establish and maintain free legal aid bureaus;
(D) Perform data processing and related administra-
tive computer services for a fee for another munici-
pality;
(E) Adopt the model ordinance concerning a
municipal freedom of information advisory board
created under subsection (0 of section 1-205 and
establish a municipal freedom of information
advisory board as provided by said ordinance and
said section.
8 Delaware Legislative 22 Del. C. § § 802. Applicability of chapter; grant of power
802 (2008).
Every municipal corporation in this State contain-
ing a population of at least 1,000 persons as shown
by the last official federal decennial census may
proceed as set forth in this chapter to amend its
municipal charter and may, subject to the condi-
tions and limitations imposed by this chapter,
amend its charter so as to have and assume all
powers which, under the Constitution of this State,
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it would be competent for the General Assembly to
grant by specific enumeration and which are not
denied by statute. This grant of power does not
include the power to enact private or civil law
governing civil relationships except as an incident
to an exercise of an independent municipal power,
nor does it include power to define and provide for
the punishment of a felony.
9 Florida Imperio Fla. Stat. § § 166.02. Powers
166.021
(2009). (1) As provided in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State
Constitution, municipalities shall have the govern-
mental, corporate, and proprietary powers to enable
them to conduct municipal government, perform
municipal functions, and render municipal services,
and may exercise any power for municipal pur-
poses, except when expressly prohibited by law.
(2) "Municipal purpose" means any activity or
power which may be exercised by the state or its
political subdivisions.
(3) The Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the
grant of power set forth in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the
State Constitution, the legislative body of each
municipality has the power to enact legislation
concerning any subject matter upon which the state
Legislature may act, except:
(a) The subjects of annexation, merger, and
exercise of extraterritorial power, which require
general or special law pursuant to s. 2(c), Art. VIII
of the State Constitution;
(b) Any subject expressly prohibited by the
constitution;
(c) Any subject expressly preempted to state or
county government by the constitution or by
general law; and
(d) Any subject preempted to a county pursuant
to a county charter adopted under the authority of
ss. I(g), 3, and 6(e), Art. VIII of the State Constitu-
tion.
(4) The provisions of this section shall be so
construed as to secure for municipalities the broad
exercise of home rule powers granted by the
constitution. It is the further intent of the Legisla-
ture to extend to municipalities the exercise of
powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or
proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by
the constitution, general or special law, or county
charter and to remove any limitations, judicially
imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule
powers other than those so expressly prohibited.
However, nothing in this act shall be construed to
permit any changes in a special law or municipal
charter which affect the exercise of extraterritorial
powers or which affect an area which includes
lands within and without a municipality or any
changes in a special law or municipal charter which
affect the creation or existence of a municipality,
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the terms of elected officers and the manner of their
election except for the selection of election dates
and qualifying periods for candidates and for
changes in terms of office necessitated by such
changes in election dates, the distribution of powers
among elected officers, matters prescribed by the
charter relating to appointive boards, any change in
the form of government, or any rights of municipal
employees, without approval by referendum of the
electors as provided in s. 166.031. Any other
limitation of power upon any municipality con-
tained in any municipal charter enacted or adopted
prior to July 1, 1973, is hereby nullified and re-
pealed.
(5) All existing special acts pertaining exclusively
to the power or jurisdiction of a particular munici-
pality except as otherwise provided in subsection
(4) shall become an ordinance of that municipality
on the effective date of this act, subject to modifica-
tion or repeal as other ordinances.
(6) The governing body of a municipality may
require that any person within the municipality
demonstrate the existence of some arrangement or
contract by which such person will dispose of solid
waste in a manner consistent with the ordinances of
the county or municipality or state or federal law.
For any person who will produce special wastes or
biomedical waste, as the same may be defined by
state or federal law or county or city ordinance, the
municipality may require satisfactory proof of a
contract or similar arrangement by which special or
biomedical wastes will be collected by a qualified
and duly licensed collector and disposed of in
accordance with the laws of Florida or the Federal
Government.
(7) Notwithstanding the prohibition against extra
compensation set forth in s. 215.425, the governing
body of a municipality may provide for an extra
compensation program, including a lump-sum
bonus payment program, to reward outstanding
employees whose performance exceeds standards,
if the program provides that a bonus payment may
not be included in an employee's regular base rate
of pay and may not be carried forward in subse-
quent years.
(8) Entities that are funded wholly or in part by the
municipality, at the discretion of the municipality,
may be required by the municipality to conduct a
performance audit paid for by the municipality. An
entity shall not be considered as funded by the
municipality by virtue of the fact that such entity
utilizes the municipality to collect taxes, assess-
ments, fees, or other revenue. If an independent
special district receives municipal funds pursuant to
a contract or interlocal agreement for the purposes
of funding, in whole or in part, a discrete program
of the district, only that program may be required
by the municipality to undergo a performance audit.
(9) (a) The Legislature finds and declares that this
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state faces increasing competition from other states
and other countries for the location and retention of
private enterprises within its borders. Furthermore,
the Legislature finds that there is a need to enhance
and expand economic activity in the municipalities
of this state by attracting and retaining manufactur-
ing development, business enterprise management,
and other activities conducive to economic promo-
tion, in order to provide a stronger, more balanced,
and stable economy in the state, to enhance and
preserve purchasing power and employment
opportunities for the residents of this state, and to
improve the welfare and competitive position of the
state. The Legislature declares that it is necessary
and in the public interest to facilitate the growth
and creation of business enterprises in the munici-
palities of the state.
(b) The governing body of a municipality may
expend public funds to attract and retain business
enterprises, and the use of public funds toward the
achievement of such economic development goals
constitutes a public purpose. The provisions of this
chapter which confer powers and duties on the
governing body of a municipality, including any
powers not specifically prohibited by law which
can be exercised by the governing body of a mu-
nicipality, shall be liberally construed in order to
effectively carry out the purposes of this subsec-
tion.
(c) For the purposes of this subsection, it consti-
tutes a public purpose to expend public funds for
economic development activities, including, but not
limited to, developing or improving local infra-
structure, issuing bonds to finance or refinance the
cost of capital projects for industrial or manufactur-
ing plants, leasing or conveying real property, and
making grants to private enterprises for the expan-
sion of businesses existing in the community or the
attraction of new businesses to the community.
(d) Nothing contained in this subsection shall be
construed as a limitation on the home role powers
granted by the State Constitution for municipalities.
(10) (a) As used in this subsection, the term:
1. "Authorized person" means a person:
a. Other than an officer or employee, as
defined in this paragraph, whether elected or
commissioned or not, who is authorized by a
municipality or agency thereof to incur travel
expenses in the performance of official duties;
b. Who is called upon by a municipality or
agency thereof to contribute time and services as
consultant or advisor; or
c. Who is a candidate for an executive or
professional position with a municipality or agency
thereof.
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2. "Employee" means an individual, whether
commissioned or not, other than an officer or
authorized person as defined in this paragraph, who
is filling a regular or full-time authorized position
and is responsible to a municipality or agency
thereof.
3. "Officer" means an individual who, in the
performance of his or her official duties, is vested
by law with sovereign powers of government and
who is either elected by the people, or commis-
sioned by the Governor and who has jurisdiction
extending throughout the municipality, or any
person lawfully serving instead of either of the
foregoing two classes of individuals as initial
designee or successor.
4. "Traveler" means an officer, employee, or
authorized person, when performing travel author-
ized by a municipality or agency thereof.
(b) Notwithstanding s. 112.061, the governing
body of a municipality or an agency thereof may
provide for a per diem and travel expense policy for
its travelers which varies from the provisions of s.
112.061. Any such policy provided by a municipal-
ity or an agency thereof on January 1, 2003, shall
be valid and in effect for that municipality or
agency thereof until otherwise amended. A munici-
pality or agency thereof that provides any per diem
and travel expense policy pursuant to this subsec-
tion shall be deemed to be exempt from all provi-
sions of s. 112.061. A municipality or agency
thereof that does not provide a per diem and travel
expense policy pursuant to this subsection remains
subject to all provisions of s. 112.061.
(c) Travel claims submitted by a traveler in a
municipality or agency thereof which is exempted
from the provisions of s. 112.061, pursuant to
paragraph (b), shall not be required to be sworn to
before a notary public or other officer authorized to
administer oaths, but any claim authorized or
required to be made under any per diem and travel
expense policy of a municipality or agency thereof
must contain a statement that the expenses were
actually incurred by the traveler as necessary travel
expenses in the performance of official duties and
shall be verified by a written declaration that it is
true and correct as to every material matter, and
any person who willfully makes and subscribes any
such claim that he or she does not believe to be true
and correct as to every material matter, or who
willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or
advises the preparation or presentation of such a
claim that is fraudulent or is false as to any material
matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with
the knowledge or consent of the person authorized
or required to present such claim, commits a
misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Whoever
receives an allowance or reimbursement by means
of a false claim is civilly liable in the amount of the
overpayment for the reimbursement of the public
2009]
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fund from which the claim was paid.
10 Georgia Imperio Ga. Const. PARAGRAPH II. Home rule for municipalities
Art. IX, § II,
Para. II
(2008) The General Assembly may provide by law for the
self-government of municipalities and to that end is
expressly given the authority to delegate its power
so that matters pertaining to municipalities may be
dealt with without the necessity of action by the
General Assembly.
11 Hawaii Imperio - HRS Const. Section 2. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT;
no munici- Art. VIII, § 2 CHARTER.
palities - (2008).
Home Rule Each political subdivision shall have the power to
only for frame and adopt a charter for its own self-
counties government within such limits and under such
procedures as may be provided by general law.
Such procedures, however, shall not require the
approval of a charter by a legislative body.
Charter provisions with respect to a political
subdivision's executive, legislative and administra-
tive structure and organization shall be superior to
statutory provisions, subject to the authority of the
legislature to enact general laws allocating and
reallocating powers and functions.
A law may qualify as a general law even though it
is inapplicable to one or more counties by reason of
the provisions of this section.
12 Idaho Imperio Idaho Const. § 2. Local police regulations authorized
Art. Yl, § 2
(2008) Any county or incorporated city or town may make
and enforce, within its limits, all such local police,
sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict
with its charter or with the general laws.
13 Ilinois Legislative 65 ILCS 5/1- Sec. 1-1-5. The corporate authorities of each
1-5 (2009) municipality may exercise jointly, with one or more
other municipal corporations or governmental
65 ILCS 5/1- subdivisions or districts, all of the powers set forth
1-7 (2009) in this Code unless expressly provided otherwise.
In this section "municipal corporations or govern-
mental subdivisions or districts" includes, but is not
limited to, municipalities, townships, counties,
school districts, park districts, sanitary districts, and
fire protection districts.
§ 65 ILCS 5/1-1-7. Power of municipality to
contract with school boards, hospitals, commercial
and industrial facilities, and owners of shopping
centers or apartment complexes. The corporate
authorities of any municipality shall have the power
to contract with school boards, hospitals, commer-
cial and industrial facilities, and owners of shop-
ping centers or apartment complexes within and
without the municipal limits in such manner as is
provided by Section 11-209 of "The Illinois Vehi-
cle Code', approved September 29, 1969, as
amended [625 ILCS 5/11-209], and as provided
under Section 2 of "An Act in relation to the
regulation of motor vehicle traffic and the promo-
tion of safety on public highways in counties',
approved August 9, 1951, as amended.
14 Indiana Legislative Bums Ind. 36-1-34. Presumption that unit has powers neces-
Code Ann. § sary to conduct affairs. (a) The rule of law that a








15 Iowa Imperio Iowa Const., Sec. 38A. Municipal home rule.
Art. lI § 38A
(2008) Municipal corporations are granted home rule
power and authority, not inconsistent with the laws
of the general assembly, to determine their local
affairs and government, except that they shall not
have power to levy any tax unless expressly author-
ized by the general assembly.
The rule or proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise only those
powers granted in express words is not a part of the
law of this state.
16 Kansas Imperio Kan. Const. 5. Cities' powers of home rule.
Art. 12,§5
(2007) (a) The legislature shall provide by general law,
applicable to all cities, for the incorporation of
cities and the methods by which city boundaries
K.S.A. § 12- may be altered, cities may be merged or consoli-
101 (2007) dated and cities may be dissolved: Provided, That
existing laws on such subjects not applicable to all
2009]
unit has only:
(1) Powers expressly granted by statute;
(2) Powers necessarily or fairly implied in or
incident to powers expressly granted; and
(3) Powers indispensable to the declared purposes
of the unit;
is abrogated.
(b) A unit has:
(1) All powers granted it by statute; and
(2) All other powers necessary or desirable in the
conduct of its affairs, even though not granted by
statute.
(c) The powers that units have under subsection
(b)(1) are listed in various statutes. However, these
statutes do not list the powers that units have under
subsection (b)(2); therefore, the omission of a
power from such a list does not imply that units
lack that power.
36-1-3-5. Limitations on exercise of powers by
statute or constitution.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a unit
may exercise any power it has to the extent that the
power:
(1) Is not expressly denied by the Indiana Consti-
tution or by statute; and
(2) Is not expressly granted to another entity.
(b) A township may not exercise power the town-
ship has if another unit in which all or part of the
township is located exercises that same power.
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cities on the effective date of this amendment shall
remain in effect until superseded by general law
and such existing laws shall not be subject to
charter ordinance.
(b) Cities are hereby empowered to determine their
local affairs and government including the levying
of taxes, excises, fees, charges and other exactions
except when and as the levying of any tax, excise,
fee, charge or other exaction is limited or prohib-
ited by enactment of the legislature applicable
uniformly to all cities of the same class: Provided,
That the legislature may establish not to exceed
four classes of cities for the purpose of imposing all
such limitations or prohibitions. Cities shall exer-
cise such determination by ordinance passed by the
governing body with referendums only in such
cases as prescribed by the legislature, subject only
to enactments of the legislature of statewide con-
cer applicable uniformly to all cities, to other
enactments of the legislature applicable uniformly
to all cities, to enactments of the legislature appli-
cable uniformly to all cities of the same class
limiting or prohibiting the levying of any tax,
excise, fee, charge or other exaction and to enact-
ments of the legislature prescribing limits of
indebtedness. All enactments relating to cities now
in effect or hereafter enacted and as later amended
and until repealed shall govern cities except as
cities shall exempt themselves by charter ordi-
nances as herein provided for in subsection (c).
(c) (1) Any city may by charter ordinance elect in
the manner prescribed in this section that the whole
or any part of any enactment of the legislature
applying to such city, other than enactments of
statewide concern applicable uniformly to all cities,
other enactments applicable uniformly to all cities,
and enactments prescribing limits of indebtedness,
shall not apply to such city.
(2) A charter ordinance is an ordinance which
exempts a city from the whole or any part of any
enactment of the legislature as refeired to in this
section and which may provide substitute and
additional provisions on the same subject. Such
charter ordinance shall be so titled, shall designate
specifically the enactment of the legislature or part
thereof made inapplicable to such city by the
adoption of such ordinance and contain the substi-
tute and additional provisions, if any, and shall
require a two-thirds vote of the members-elect of
the governing body of such city. Every charter
ordinance shall be published once each week for
two consecutive weeks in the official city newspa-
per or, if there is none, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city.
(3) No charter ordinance shall take effect until sixty
days after its final publication. If within sixty days
of its final publication a petition signed by a num-
ber of electors of the city equal to not less than ten
percent of the number of electors who voted at the
last preceding regular city election shall be filed in
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the office of the clerk of such city demanding that
such ordinance be submitted to a vote of the elec-
tors, it shall not take effect until submitted to a
referendum and approved by a majority of the
electors voting thereon. An election, if called, shall
be called within thirty days and held within ninety
days after the filing of the petition. The governing
body shall pass an ordinance calling the election
and fixing the date, which ordinance shall be
published once each week for three consecutive
weeks in the official city newspaper or, if there be
none, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
city, and the election shall be conducted as elec-
tions for officers and by the officers handling such
elections. The proposition shall be: "Shall charter
ordinance No., entitled (title of ordinance) take
effect" The governing body may submit any charter
ordinance to a referendum without petition by the
same publication of the charter ordinance and the
same publication of the ordinance calling the
election as for ordinances upon petition and such
charter ordinance shall then become effective when
approved by a majority of the electors voting
thereon. Each charter ordinance becoming effective
shall be recorded by the clerk in a book maintained
for that purpose with a statement of the manner of
adoption and a certified copy shall be filed with the
secretary of state, who shall keep an index of the
same.
(4) Each charter ordinance enacted shall control
and prevail over any prior or subsequent act of the
governing body of the city and may be repealed or
amended only by charter ordinance or by enact-
ments of the legislature applicable to all cities.
(d) Powers and authority granted cities pursuant to
this section shall be liberally construed for the
purpose of giving to cities the largest measure of
self-government.
(e) This amendment shall be effective on and after
July 1, 1961.
12-101. Corporate powers; home rule of local
affairs and government.
Article 12, section 5 of the constitution of Kansas
empowers cities to determine their local affairs and
government by ordinance and enables the legisla-
ture to enact laws governing cities. Each city being
a body corporate and politic, may among other
powers --
First. Sue and be sued.
Second. Purchase or receive, by bequest or gift,
and hold, real and personal property for the use of
the city.
Third. Sell and convey any real or personal estate
owned by the city, and make such order respecting
the same as may be deemed conducive to the
I I _ interests of the city, and to provide for the im-
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provement, regulation and government of the same.
Fourth. Make all contracts and do all other acts in
relation to the property and concerns of the city
necessary to the exercise of its corporate or admin-
istrative powers.
Fifth. Have and use a corporate seal, and alter the
same at pleasure.
Sixth. Exercise such other and further powers as
may be conferred by the constitution or statutes of
this state.
17 Kentucky Legislative KRS § 82.082 82.082. Power for public purpose only and not in
(2009) conflict with Constitution or statutes.
(1) A city may exercise any power and perform any
function within its boundaries, including the power
of eminent domain in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, that
is in furtherance of a public purpose of the city and
not in conflict with a constitutional provision or
statute.
(2) A power or function is in conflict with a statute
if it is expressly prohibited by a statute or there is a
comprehensive scheme of legislation on the same
general subject embodied in the Kentucky Revised
Statutes including, but not limited to, the provisions
of KRS Chapters 95 and 96.
Imperio La. Const.
Art. VI, § 5
(2008).
§ 5. Home rule charter
A. Authority to Adopt; Commission.. Subject to
and not inconsistent with this constitution, any local
governmental subdivision may draft, adopt, or
amend a home rule charter in accordance with this
Section. The governing authority of a local gov-
ernmental subdivision may appoint a commission
to prepare and propose a charter or an alternate
charter, or it may call an election to elect such a
commission.
B. Petition to Elect Commission.. The governing
authority shall call an election to elect such a
commission when presented with a petition signed
by not less than ten percent of the electors or ten
thousand electors, whichever is fewer, who live
within the boundaries of the affected subdivision,
as certified by the registrar of voters.
C. Adoption; Amendment; Repeal.. A home rule
charter shall be adopted, amended, or repealed
when approved by a majority of the electors voting
thereon at an election held for that purpose.
D. Adoption by Two or More Local Governmental
Subdivisions.. Two or more local governmental
subdivisions within the boundaries of one parish
may adopt a home rule charter under this Section if
approved by a majority of the electors in each
affected local governmental subdivision voting
thereon in an election held for that purpose. The
leislature shall crovide by law the method of
1396
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appointment or election of a commission to prepare
and propose a charter consistent with Paragraph (A)
of this Section and the method by which the elec-
tors may petition for an election consistent with
Paragraph (B) of this Section. However, at least one
member of the commission shall be elected or
appointed from each affected local governmental
subdivision.
E. Structure and Organization; Powers; Func-
tions.. A home rule charter adopted under this
Section shall provide the structure and organiza-
tion, powers, and functions of the government of
the local governmental subdivision, which may
include the exercise of any power and performance
of any function necessary, requisite, or proper for
the management of its affairs, not denied by general
law or inconsistent with this constitution.
F. Additional Powers and Functions.. Except as
prohibited by its charter, a local governmental
subdivision adopting a home rule charter under this
Section shall have the additional powers and
functions granted to local governmental subdivi-
sions by other provisions of this constitution.
G. Parish Officials and School Boards Not Af-
fected.. No home rule charter or plan of government
shall contain any provision affecting a school board
or the offices of district attorney, sheriff, assessor,
clerk of a district court, or coroner, which is incon-
sistent with this constitution or law.
19 Maine Imperio Me. Const. § 1. Power of municipalities to amend their char-
Art. VII, Pt. ters
2, § 1 (2008)
Section 1. The inhabitants of any municipality shall
have the power to alter and amend their charters on
all matters, not prohibited by Constitution or
general law, which are local and municipal in
character. The Legislature shall prescribe the
procedure by which the municipality may so act.
20 Maryland Imperio Md. Const. Section 3. Home rule
art. XI-E, § 3
(2008) Any such municipal corporation, now existing or
hereafter created, shall have the power and author-
ity, (a) to amend or repeal an existing charter or
local laws relating to the incorporation, organiza-
tion, government, or affairs of said municipal
corporation heretofore enacted by the General
Assembly of Maryland, and (b) to adopt a new
charter, and to amend or repeal any charter adopted
under the provisions of this Article.
21 Massachusetts Legislative ALM GL ch. § 13. Powers Exercisable by Cities and Towns;
43B, § 13 Limitations and Exceptions.
(2009)
Any city or town may, by the adoption, amendment
or repeal of local ordinances or by-laws, exercise
any power or function which the general court has
power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent
with the constitution or laws enacted by the general
court in conformity with powers reserved to the
general court by Section 8 of Article LXXXIX of
the Amendments to the Constitution and which is
not denied, either expressly or by clear implication,
to the city or town by its charter. Whenever appro-
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priations, appointments, orders, regulations or other
legislative or executive actions within the scope of
any such ordinance or by-law are necessary in the
exercise of any power or function authorized by
such ordinance or by-law, any such actions which
are to be taken by a city council or town meeting
may be taken by ordinance, by-law, resolution,
order or vote, and any such actions which are to be
taken by executive officers may be taken in any
appropriate manner, subject, however, as to both
such categories, to all provisions of the ordinance
or by-law in question, the city or town charter, and
other applicable law. Any requirement that an
ordinance or by-law be entitled as such, or that it
contain the word "ordained," "enacted" or words of
similar import shall not affect the validity of any
action which is required to be taken by ordinance or
by-law. Nothing in this section shall be construed
to permit any city or town, by ordinance or by-law,
to exercise any power or function which is incon-
sistent with any general law enacted by the general
court before November eighth, nineteen hundred
and sixty-six which applies alike to all cities, or to
all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of
not fewer than two. No exercise of a power or
function denied to the city or town, expressly or by
clear implication, by special laws having the force
of a charter under section nine of said Article, and
no change in the composition, mode of election or
appointment, or terms of office of the legislative
body, the mayor or city manager or the board of
selectmen or town manager, may be accomplished
by by-law or ordinance. Such special laws may be
made inapplicable, and such changes may be
accomplished, only under procedures for the
adoption, revision or amendment of a charter under
this chapter.
22 Michigan Imperio MCLS Const. § 22. Charters, resolutions, ordinances; enumera-
Art. VII, § 22 tion of powers.
(2009)
Sec. 22. Under general laws the electors of each
city and village shall have the power and authority
to frame, adopt and amend its charter, and to amend
an existing charter of the city or village heretofore
granted or enacted by the legislature for the gov-
ernment of the city or village. Each such city and
village shall have power to adopt resolutions and
ordinances relating to its municipal concerns,
property and government, subject to the constitu-
tion and law. No enumeration of powers granted to
cities and villages in this constitution shall limit or
restrict the general grant of authority conferred by
this section.
23 Minnesota Legislative Minn. Const., Sec. 4. Home rule charter
Art. X19, § 4
(2008) Any local government unit when authorized by law
may adopt a home rule charter for its government.
A charter shall become effective if approved by
such majority of the voters of the local government
unit as the legislature prescribes by general law. If a
charter provides for the consolidation or separation
of a city and a county, in whole or in part, it shall
not be effective without approval of the voters both
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in the city and in the remainder of the county by the
majority required by law.
24 Mississippi Imperio Miss. Code § 21-17-1. General grant of powers
Ann. § 21-17-
1 (2008) (1) Every municipality of this state shall be a
municipal corporation and shall have power to sue
and be sued; to purchase and hold real estate, either
within or without the corporate limits, for all proper
municipal purposes, including parks, cemeteries,
hospitals, schoolhouses, houses of correction,
waterworks, electric lights, sewers and other proper
municipal purposes; to purchase and hold personal
property for all proper municipal purposes; to
acquire equipment and machinery by lease-
purchase agreement and to pay interest thereon, if
contracted, when needed for proper municipal
purposes; to sell and convey any real and personal
property owned by it, and make such order respect-
ing the same as may be deemed conducive to the
best interest of the municipality, and exercise
jurisdiction over the same.
(2) (a) In case any of the real property belonging to
a municipality shall cease to be used for municipal
purposes, the governing authority of the municipal-
ity may sell, convey or lease the same on such
terms as the municipal authority may elect. In case
of a sale on a credit, the municipality shall charge
appropriate interest as contracted and shall have a
lien on the same for the purchase money, as against
all persons, until paid and may enforce the lien as
in such cases provided by law. The deed of convey-
ance in such cases shall be executed in the name of
the municipality by the governing authority of the
municipality pursuant to an order entered on the
minutes. In any sale or conveyance of real property,
the municipality shall retain all mineral rights that it
owns, together with the right of ingress and egress
to remove same. Except as otherwise provided in
this section, before any such lease, deed or convey-
ance is executed, the governing authority of the
municipality shall publish at least once each week
for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a public news-
paper of the municipality in which the real property
is located, or if no newspaper be published as such,
then in a newspaper having general circulation
therein, the intention to lease or sell, as the case
may be, the municipally owned real property and to
accept sealed competitive bids for the leasing or
sale. The governing authority of the municipality
shall thereafter accept bids for the lease or sale and
shall award the lease or sale to the highest bidder in
the manner provided by law. However, whenever
the governing authority of the municipality shall
find and determine, by resolution duly and lawfully
adopted and spread upon its minutes (i) that any
municipally owned real property is no longer
needed for municipal or related purposes and is not
to be used in the operation of the municipality, (ii)
that the sale of such property in the manner other-
wise provided by law is not necessary or desirable
for the financial welfare of the municipality, and
(iii) that the use of such property for the purpose for
which it is to be sold, conveyed or leased will
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promote and foster the development and improve-
ment of the community in which it is located and
the civic, social, educational, cultural, moral,
economic or industrial welfare thereof, the govern-
ing authority of the municipality shall be authorized
and empowered, in its discretion, to sell, convey or
lease same for any of the purposes set forth herein
without having to advertise for and accept competi-
tive bids.
(b) In any case in which a municipality proposes
to sell, convey or lease real property under the
provisions of this subsection (2) without advertising
for and accepting competitive bids, the governing
authority may sell, convey or lease the property as
follows:
(i) Consideration for the purchase, conveyance
or lease of the property shall be not less than the
average of the fair market price for such property as
determined by three (3) professional property
appraisers selected by the municipality and ap-
proved by the purchaser or lessee. Appraisal fees
shall be shared equally by the municipality and the
purchaser or lessee; or
(ii) The governing authority of a municipality
may contract for the professional services of a
Mississippi licensed real estate broker to assist the
municipality in the marketing and sale or lease of
the property, and may provide the broker reason-
able compensation for services rendered to be paid
from the sale or lease proceeds. The reasonable
compensation shall not exceed the usual and
customary compensation for similar services within
the municipality.
(3) Whenever the governing authority of the
municipality shall find and determine by resolution
duly and lawfully adopted and spread upon the
minutes that municipally owned real property is not
used for municipal purposes and therefore surplus
as set forth in subsection (2) of this section:
(a) The governing authority may donate such
lands to a bona fide not-for-profit civic or dee-
mosynary corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Mississippi and granted tax
exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service and
may donate such lands and necessary funds related
thereto to the public school district in which the
land is situated for the purposes set forth herein.
Any deed or conveyance executed pursuant hereto
shall contain a clause of reverter providing that the
bona fide not-for-profit corporation or public
school district may hold title to such lands only so
long as they are continued to be used for the civic,
social, educational, cultural, moral, economic or
industrial welfare of the community, and that title
shall revert to the municipality in the event of the
cessation of such use for a period of two (2) years.
In any such deed or conveyance, the municipality
shall retain all mineral rights that it owns, together
with the right of ingress and egress to remove
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same;
(b) (i) The governing authority may donate such
lands to a bona fide not-for-profit corporation (such
as Habitat for Humanity) which is primarily en-
gaged in the construction of housing for persons
who otherwise can afford to live only in substan-
dard housing. In any such deed or conveyance, the
municipality shall retain all mineral rights that it
owns, together with the right of ingress and egress
to remove same;
(ii) In the event the governing authority does
not wish to donate title to such lands to the bona
fide not-for-profit civic or eleemosynary corpora-
tion, but wishes to retain title to the lands, the
governing authority may lease the lands to a bona
fide not-for-profit corporation described in para-
graph (a) or (b) for less than fair market value;
(c) The governing authority may donate any
municipally owned lot measuring twenty-five (25)
feet or less along the frontage line as follows: the
governing authority may cause the lot to be divided
in half along a line running generally perpendicular
to the frontage line and may convey each one-half (
1/2) of that lot to the owners of the parcels laterally
adjoining the municipally owned lot. All costs
associated with a conveyance under this paragraph
(c) shall be paid by the person or entity to whom
the conveyance is made. In any such deed or
instrument of conveyance, the municipality shall
retain all mineral rights that it owns, together with
the right of ingress and egress to remove same.
(d) Nothing contained in this subsection (3) shall
be construed to prohibit, restrict or to prescribe
conditions with regard to the authority granted
under Section 17-25-3.
(4) Every municipality shall also be authorized and
empowered to loan to private persons or entities,
whether organized for profit or nonprofit, funds
received from the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under an
urban development action grant or a community
development block grant under the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974 (Public Law
93-383), as amended, and to charge interest thereon
if contracted, provided that no such loan shall
include any funds from any revenues other than the
funds from the United States Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development; to make all contracts
and do all other acts in relation to the property and
affairs of the municipality necessary to the exercise
of its governmental, corporate and administrative
powers; and to exercise such other or further
powers as are otherwise conferred by law.
(5) (a) The governing authority of any municipality
may establish an employer-assisted housing pro-
gram to provide funds to eligible employees to be
used toward the purchase of a home. This assis-
tance may be applied toward the down payment,
closing costs or any other fees or costs associated
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with the purchase of a home. The housing assis-
tance may be in the form of a grant, forgivable loan
or repayable loan. The governing authority of a
municipality may contract with one or more public
or private entities to provide assistance in imple-
menting and administering the program and shall
adopt rules and regulations regarding the eligibility
of a municipality for the program and for the
implementation and administration of the program.
However, no general funds of a municipality may
be used for a grant or loan under the program.
(b) Participation in the program established under
this subsection (5) shall be available to any eligible
municipal employee as determined by the govern-
ing authority of the municipality. Any person who
receives financial assistance under the program
must purchase a house and reside within certain
geographic boundaries as determined by the gov-
erning authority of the municipality.
(c) If the assistance authorized under this subsec-
tion (5) is structured as a forgivable loan, the
participating employee must remain as an employee
of the municipality for an agreed upon period of
time, as determined by the rules and regulations
adopted by the governing authority of the munici-
pality, in order to have the loan forgiven. The
forgiveness structure, amount of assistance and
repayment terms shall be determined by the gov-
eming authority of the municipality,
(6) The governing authority of any municipality
may contract with a private attorney or private
collection agent or agency to collect any type of
delinquent payment owed to the municipality,
including, but not limited to, past due fees and
fines. Any such contract debt may provide for
payment contingent upon successful collection
efforts or payment based upon a percentage of the
delinquent amount collected; however, the entire
amount of all delinquent payments collected shall
be remitted to the municipality and shall not be
reduced by any collection costs or fees. Any private
attorney or private collection agent or agency
contracting with the municipality under the provi-
sions of this subsection shall give bond or other
surety payable to the municipality in such amount
as the governing authority of the municipality
deems sufficient. Any private attorney with whom
the municipality contracts under the provisions of
this subsection must be a member in good standing
of The Mississippi Bar. Any private collection
agent or agency with whom the municipality
contracts under the provisions of this subsection
must meet all licensing requirements for doing
business in the State of Mississippi. Neither the
municipality nor any officer or employee of the
municipality shall be liable, civilly or criminally,
for any wrongful or unlawful act or omission of any
person or business with whom the municipality has
contracted under the provisions of this subsection.
The Mississippi Department of Audit shall establish
rules and regulations for use by municipalities in
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contracting with persons or businesses under the
provisions of this subsection. If a municipality uses
its own employees to collect any type of delinquent
payment owed to the municipality, then from and
after July 1, 2000, the municipality may charge an
additional fee for collection of the delinquent
payment provided the payment has been delinquent
for ninety (90) days. The collection fee may not
exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the delinquent
payment if the collection is made within this state
and may not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of
the delinquent payment if the collection is made
outside this state. In conducting collection of
delinquent payments, the municipality may utilize
credit cards or electronic fund transfers. The
municipality may pay any service fees for the use
of such methods of collection from the collection
fee, but not from the delinquent payment. There
shall be due to the municipality from any person
whose delinquent payment is collected under a
contract executed as provided in this subsection an
amount, in addition to the delinquent payment, of
not to exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the
delinquent payment for collections made within this
state, and not to exceed fifty percent (50%) of the
delinquent payment for collections made outside of
this state.
(7) In addition to such authority as is otherwise
granted under this section, the governing authority
of any municipality may expend funds necessary to
maintain and repair, and to purchase liability
insurance, tags and decals for, any personal prop-
erty acquired under the Federal Excess Personal
Property Program that is used by the local volunteer
fire department.
(8) The governing authority of any municipality
may, in its discretion, donate personal property or
funds to the public school district or districts
located in the municipality fur the promotion of
educational programs of the district or districts
within the municipality.
(9) In addition to the authority to expend matching
funds under Section 21-19-65, the governing
authority of any municipality, in its discretion, may
expend municipal funds to match any state, federal
or private funding for any program administered by
the State of Mississippi, the United States govern-
ment or any nonprofit organization that is exempt
under 26 USCS Section 501(c) (3) from paying
federal income tax.
(10) The governing authority of any municipality
that owns and operates a gas distribution system, as
defined in Section 21-27-11(b), and the governing
authority of any public natural gas district are
authorized to contract for the purchase of the
supply of natural gas for a term of up to ten (10)
years with any public nonprofit corporation which
is organized under the laws of this state or any
other state.
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(11) The governing authority of any municipality
may perform and exercise any duty, responsibility
or function, may enter into agreements and con-
tracts, may provide and deliver any services or
assistance, and may receive, expend and administer
any grants, gifts, matching funds, loans or other
monies, in accordance with and as may be author-
ized by any federal law, rule or regulation creating,
establishing or providing for any program, activity
or service. The provisions of this subsection shall
not be construed as authorizing any municipality or
the governing authority of such municipality to
perform any function or activity that is specifically
prohibited under the laws of this state or as granting
any authority in addition to or in conflict with the
provisions of any federal law, rule or regulation.
(12) (a) In addition to such authority as is otherwise
granted under this section, the governing authority
of a municipality, in its discretion, may sell, lease,
donate or otherwise convey property to any person
or legal entity without public notice, without having
to advertise for and accept competitive bids and
without appraisal, with or without consideration,
and on such terms and conditions as the parties may
agree if the governing authority finds and deter-
mines, by resolution duly and lawfully adopted and
spread upon its official minutes:
(i) The subject property is real property ac-
quired by the municipality:
I. By reason of a tax sale;
2. Because the property was abandoned or
blighted; or
3. In a proceeding to satisfy a municipal lien
against the property;
(ii) The subject property is blighted and is
located in a blighted area;
(iii) The subject property is not needed for
governmental or related purposes and is not to be
used in the operation of the municipality;
(iv) That the sale of the property in the manner
otherwise provided by law is not necessary or
desirable for the financial welfare of the municipal-
ity; and
(v) That the use of the property for the purpose
for which it is to be conveyed will promote and
foster the development and improvement of the
community in which it is located or the civic,
social, educational, cultural, moral, economic or
industrial welfare thereof; the purpose for which
the property is conveyed shall be stated.
(b) All costs associated with a conveyance under
this subsection shall be paid by the person or entity
to whom the conveyance is made.
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(c) Any deed or instrument of conveyance exe-
cuted pursuant to the authority granted under this
subsection shall contain a clause of reverter provid-
ing that title to the property wil revert to the
municipality if the person or entity to whom the
property is conveyed does not fulfill the purpose for
which the property was conveyed and satisfy all
conditions imposed on the conveyance within two
(2) years of the date of the conveyance.
(d) In any such deed or instrument of conveyance,
the municipality shall retain all mineral rights that it
owns, together with the right of ingress and egress
to remove same.
(13) The powers conferred by this section shall be
in addition and supplemental to the powers con-
ferred by any other law, and nothing contained in
this section shall be construed to prohibit, or to
prescribe conditions concerning, any practice or
practices authorized under any other law.
25 Misuri Legislative Mo. Const. § 19(a). Power of charter cities, how limited
Art. VI, §
19(a) (2009) Any city which adopts or has adopted a charter
for its own government, shall have all powers
which the general assembly of the state of Missouri
has authority to confer upon any city, provided
such powers are consistent with the constitution of
this state and are not limited or denied either by the
charter so adopted or by statute. Such a city shall,
in addition to its home rule powers, have all powers
conferred by law.
26 Montana Legislative Mont. Const., Section 5. Self-government charters.
Art. XI §§ 5,6
(2007). (1) The legislature shall provide procedures
permitting a local government unit or combination
of units to frame, adopt, amend, revise, or abandon
a self-government charter with the approval of a
majority of those voting on the question. The
procedures shall not require approval of a charter
by a legislative body.
(2) If the legislature does not provide such proce-
dures by July 1, 1975, they may be established by
election either:
(a) Initiated by petition in the local government
unit or combination of units; or
(b) Called by the governing body of the local
government unit or combination of units.
(3) Charter provisions establishing executive,
legislative, and administrative structure and organi-
zation are superior to statutory provisions.
Section 6. Self-government powers.
A local government unit adopting a self-
government charter may exercise any power not
prohibited by this constitution, law, or charter. This
grant of self-government powers may be extended
to other local government units through optional
forms of government provided for in section 3.
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27 Nebraska Legislative Ne. Const. § 2. City of 5,000 may frame charter, procedure.
Art. X, §§ 2,
5(2009). Any city having a population of more than five
thousand (5000) inhabitants may frame a charter
for its own government, consistent with and subject
to the constitution and laws of this state, by causing
a convention of fifteen freeholders, who shall have
been for at least five years qualified electors
thereof, to be elected by the qualified voters of said
city at any general or special election, whose duty it
shall be within four months after such election, to
prepare and propose a charter for such city, which
charter, when completed, with a prefatory synopsis,
shall be signed by the officers and members of the
convention, or a majority thereof, and delivered to
the clerk of said city, who shall publish the same in
full, with his official certification, in the official
paper of said city, if there be one, and if there be no
official paper, then in at least one newspaper
published and in general circulation in said city,
three times, and a week apart, and within not less
than thirty days after such publication it shall be
submitted to the qualified electors of said city at a
general or special election, and if a majority of such
qualified voters, voting thereon, shall ratify the
same, it shall at the end of sixty days thereafter,
become the charter of said city, and supersede any
existing charter and all amendments thereof. A
duplicate certificate shall be made, setting forth the
charter proposed and its ratification (together with
the vote for and against) and duly certified by the
City Clerk, and authenticated by the corporate seal
of said city and one copy thereof shall be filed with
the Secretary of State and the other deposited
among the archives of the city, and shall thereupon
become and be the charter of said city, and all
amendments of such charter, shall be authenticated
in the same manner, and filed with the secretary of
state and deposited in the archives of the city.
§ 5. Charter of city of 100,000; home rule charter
authorized.
The charter of any city having a population of more
than one hundred thousand inhabitants may be
adopted as the home rule charter of such city by a
majority vote of the qualified electors of such city
voting upon the question, and when so adopted may
thereafter be changed or amended as provided in
Section 4 of this article, subject to the Constitution
and laws of the state.
28 Nevada
29 New Legislative RSA49-B:I 49-B:1 Purpose and Intent.
Hampshire (2009)
It is the purpose of this chapter to implement the
N.H. Const. home rule powers recognized by article 39, part
Pt. FIRST, first, of the constitution of the state of New Hamp-
Art. 39. shire. To that end, the general court hereby pro-
(2009) vides a vehicle whereby a municipality may adopt a
form of government that best addresses local needs.
At the same time, however, the general court
recognizes a need to require uniform procedures
and practices when there is a corresponding state
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interest. Therefore, this chapter is intended only to
provide a procedural framework by which a city or
town may amend its actual form of government.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to create
any power in, or confer any power upon, any city or
town beyond that necessary to carry out the amend-
ment of a charter or form of government as set forth
in this chapter. The general laws of this state shall
remain in full force and effect, and they shall be
construed to be consistent with this chapter to the
greatest extent possible in the effectuation of this
chapter's stated purpose. Accordingly, this chapter
shall be strictly interpreted to allow towns and
cities to adopt, amend, or revise a municipal charter
relative to their form of government so long as the
resulting charter is neither in conflict with nor
inconsistent with the general laws or the constitu-
tion of this state.
Art. 39. [Changes in Town and City Charters,
Referendum Required.]
No law changing the charter or form of govern-
ment of a particular city or town shall be enacted by
the legislature except to become effective upon the
approval of the voters of such city or town upon a
referendum to be provided for in said law.
The legislature may by general law authorize cities
and towns to adopt or amend their charters or forms
of government in any way which is not in conflict
with general law, provided that such charters or
amendments shall become effective only upon the
approval of the voters of each such city or town on
a referendum.
30 New Jersey Legislative N.J. Stat. § § 40:20-1.2. Grant of powers
40:20-1.2
(2009) The grant of powers under this amendatory and
supplementary act is intended to be as broad as is
consistent with the Constitution of the State of New
Jersey and with general law relating to local gov-
ernment. The grant of powers shall be construed as
liberally as possible in regard to the county's right
to reorganize its structure and to alter or abolish its
agencies, subject to the general mandate of per-
forming services, whether they be performed by the
agency previously established or by a new agency
or another department of county government. All
county offices, boards, commissions, and authori-
ties authorized or established by statute, other than
those boards and offices which are subject to the
provisions of subsection b. of section 4 of this
amendatory and supplementary act, and other than
educational institutions authorized or established
pursuant to Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes,
shall be considered to be county agencies for the
purposes of this section.
31 New Mexico Legislative N.M. Const. § 6. Municipal elections; charters; legislative
art. X, § 6 powers and taxation
(2008) D. A municipality which adopts a charter may
exercise all legislative powers and perform all
functions not expressly denied by general law or
charter. This grant of powers shall not include the
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power to enact private or civil laws governing civil
relationships except as incident to the exercise of an
independent municipal power, nor shall it include
the power to provide for a penalty greater than the
penalty provided for a petty misdemeanor. No tax
imposed by the governing body of a charter mu-
nicipality, except a tax authorized by general law,
shall become effective until approved by a majority
vote in the charter municipality.
E. The purpose of this section is to provide for
maximum local self-government. A liberal con-
struction shall be given to the powers of munici-
palities. (As added November 3, 1970.)
32 New York Imperio NY CLS § 2. Powers and duties of legislature; home rule
Const Art IX, powers of local governments; statute of local
§ 2 (2009) governments
(a) The legislature shall provide for the creation and
organization of local governments in such manner
as shall secure to them the rights, powers, privi-
leges and immunities granted to them by this
constitution.
(b) Subject to the bill of rights of local governments
and other applicable provisions of this constitution,
the legislature:
(1) Shall enact, and may from time to time
amend, a statute of local governments granting to
local governments powers including but not limited
to those of local legislation and administration in
addition to the powers vested in them by this
article. A power granted in such statute may be
repealed, diminished, impaired or suspended only
by enactment of a statute by the legislature with the
approval of the governor at its regular session in
one calendar year and the re-enactment and ap-
proval of such statute in the following calendar
year.
(2) Shall have the power to act in relation to the
property, affairs or government of any local gov-
erment only by general law, or by special law only
(a) on request of two-thirds of the total membership
of its legislative body or on request of its chief
executive officer concurred in by a majority of such
membership, or (b), except in the case of the city of
New York, on certificate of necessity from the
governor reciting facts which in [fig I] the judg-
ment of the governor constitute an emergency
requiring enactment of such law and, in such latter
case, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the
members elected to each house of the legislature.
(3) Shall have the power to confer on local
governments powers not relating to their property,
affairs or government including but not limited to
those of local legislation and administration, in
addition to those otherwise granted by or pursuant
to this article, and to withdraw or restrict such
additional powers.
(c) In addition to powers granted in the statute of
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local governments or any other law, (i) every local
government shall have power to adopt and amend
local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of
this constitution or any general law relating to its
property, affairs or government and, (ii) every local
government shall have power to adopt and amend
local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of
this constitution or any general law relating to the
following subjects, whether or not they relate to the
property, affairs or government of such local
government, except to the extent that the legislature
shall restrict the adoption of such a local law
relating to other than the property, affairs or gov-
ernment of such local government:
(1) The powers, duties, qualifications, number,
mode of selection and removal, terms of office,
compensation, hours of work, protection, welfare
and safety of its officers and employees, except that
cities and towns shall not have such power with
respect to members of the legislative body of the
county in their capacities as county officers.
(2) In the case of a city, town or village, the
membership and composition of its legislative
body.
(3) The transaction of its business.
(4) The incurring of its obligations, except that
local laws relating to financing by the issuance of
evidences of indebtedness by such local govern-
ment shall be consistent with laws enacted by the
legislature.
(5) The presentation, ascertainment and discharge
of claims against it.
(6) The acquisition, care, management and use of
its highways, roads, streets, avenues and property.
(7) The acquisition of its transit facilities and the
ownership and operation thereof.
(8) The levy, collection and administration of
local taxes authorized by the legislature and of
assessments for local improvements, consistent
with laws enacted by the legislature.
(9) The wages or salaries, the hours of work or
labor, and the protection, welfare and safety of
persons employed by any contractor or sub-
contractor performing work, labor or services for it.
(10) The government, protection, order, conduct,
safety, health and well-being of persons or property
therein.
(d) Except in the case of a transfer of functions
under an alternative form of county government, a
local government shall not have power to adopt
local laws which impair the powers of any other
local government.
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(e) The rights and powers of local governments
specified in this section insofar as applicable to any




34 North Dakota Imperio N.D. Cent. 40-05.1-06. Powers.
Code, § 40-
05.1-06 From and after the filing with the secretary of
(2009) state of a charter framed and approved in reason-
able conformity with the provisions of this chapter,
such city, and the citizens thereof, shall, if included
in the charter and implemented through ordinances,
have the following powers set out in this chapter:
I. To acquire, hold, operate, and dispose of
property within or without the corporate limits, and,
subject to chapter 32-15, exercise the right of
eminent domain for such purposes.
2. To control its finances and fiscal affairs; to
appropriate money for its purposes, and make
payment of its debts and expenses; to levy and
collect taxes, excises, fees, charges, and special
assessments for benefits conferred, for its public
and proprietary functions, activities, operations,
undertakings, and improvements; to contract debts,
borrow money, issue bonds, warrants, and other
evidences of indebtedness; to establish charges for
any city or other services, and to establish debt and
mill levy limitations, provided that all real and
personal property in order to be subject to the
assessment provisions of this subsection shall be
assessed in a uniform manner as prescribed by the
state board of equalization and the state supervisor
of assessments. The authority to levy taxes under
this subsection does not include authority to impose
income taxes.
3. To fix the fees, number, terms, conditions,
duration, and manner of issuing and revoking
licenses in the exercise of its governmental police
powers.
4. To provide for city officers, agencies, and
employees, their selection, terms, powers, duties,
qualifications, and compensation. To provide for
change, selection, or creation of its form and
structure of government, including its governing
body, executive officer, and city officers.
5. To provide for city courts, their jurisdiction
and powers over ordinance violations, duties,
administration, and the selection, qualifications,
and compensation of their officers; however, the
right of appeal from judgment of such courts shall
not be in any way affected.
6. To provide for all matters pertaining to city
elections, except as to qualifications of electors.
7. To provide for the adoption, amendment, and
repeal of ordinances, resolutions, and regulations to
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carry out its governmental and proprietary powers
and to provide for public health, safety, morals, and
welfare, and penalties for a violation thereof.
8. To lay out or vacate streets, alleys, and public
grounds, and to provide for the use, operation, and
regulation thereof.
9. To define offenses against private persons and
property and the public health, safety, morals, and
welfare, and provide penalties for violations
thereof.
10. To engage in any utility, business, or enter-
prise permitted by the constitution or not prohibited
by statute or to grant and regulate franchises
therefor to a private person, firm, corporation, or
limited liability company.
11. To provide for zoning, planning, and subdivi-
sion of public or private property within the city
limits. To provide for such zoning, planning, and
subdivision of public or private property outside the
city limits as may be permitted by state law.
12. To levy and collect franchise and license
taxes for revenue purposes.
13. To exercise in the conduct of its affairs all
powers usually exercised by a corporation.
14. To fix the boundary limits of said city and the
annexation and deannexation of territory adjacent
to said city except that such power shall be subject
to, and shall conform with the state law made and
provided.
15. To contract with and receive grants from any
other governmental entity or agency, with respect
to any local, state, or federal program, project, or
works.
16. To impose registration fees on motor vehicles,
farm machinery gross receipts taxes, alcoholic
beverage gross receipts taxes, or sales and use taxes
in addition to any other taxes imposed by law. After
December 31, 2005, sales and use taxes and gross
receipts taxes levied under this chapter:
a. Must conform in all respects with regard to
the taxable or exempt status of items under chapters
57-39.2, 57-39.5, 57-39.6, and 57-40.2 and may not
be imposed at multiple rates with the exception of
sales of electricity, piped natural or artificial gas, or
other heating fuels delivered by the seller or the
retail sale or transfer of motor vehicles, aircraft,
watercraft, modular homes, manufactured homes,
or mobile homes.
b. May not be newly imposed or changed
except to be effective on the first day of a calendar
quarterly period after a minimum of ninety days'
notice to the tax commissioner or, for purchases
from printed catalogs, on the first day of a calendar
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quarter after a minimum of one hundred twenty
days' notice to the seller.
c. May not be limited to apply to less than the
full value of the transaction or item as determined
for state sales and use tax purposes, except for farm
machinery gross receipts tax.
d. Must be subject to collection by the tax
commissioner under an agreement under section
57-01-02.1 and must be administered by the tax
commissioner in accordance with the relevant
provisions of chapter 57-39.2, including reporting
and paying requirements, correction of errors,
payment of refunds, and application of penalty and
interest.
It is the intention of this chapter to grant and
confirm to the people of all cities coming within its
provisions the full right of self-government in both
local and city matters within the powers enumer-
ated herein. The statutes of the state of North
Dakota, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply
to home rule cities, except insofar as superseded by
the charters of such cities or by ordinance passed
pursuant to such charters.
After December 31, 2005, any portion of a charter
or any portion of an ordinance passed pursuant to a
charter which does not conform to the requirements
of subsection 16 is invalid to the extent that it does
not conform.
The invalidity of a portion of a charter or ordinance
because it does not conform to subsection 16 does
not affect the validity of any other portion of the
charter or ordinance or the eligibility for a refund
under section 57-01-02.1. Any taxes imposed under
this chapter on farm machinery, farm irrigation
equipment, and farm machinery repair parts used
exclusively for agricultural purposes, or on alco-
holic beverages, which were in effect on December
31, 2005, become gross receipts taxes after Decem-
ber31, 2005.
35 Ohio Imperio Oh. Const. § 7. Municipal charter
Art. XVIII, § 7
(2009) Any municipality may frame and adopt or amend a
charter for its government and may, subject to the
provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise
thereunder all powers of local self-government.
36 Oklahoma Legislative Okl. Const. § 3(a). Framing and adoption of charter--Approval
Art. XVII, § by Governor--Effect--Record--Amendment
3(a) (2008)
Any city containing a population of more than
two thousand inhabitants may frame a charter for
its own government, consistent with and subject to
the Constitution and laws of this State, by causing a
board of freeholders, composed of two from each
ward, who shall be qualified electors of said city, to
be elected by the qualified electors of said city, at
any general or special election, whose duty it shall
be, within ninety days after such election, to pre-
pare and propose a charter for such city, which
shall be signed in duplicate by the members of such
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board or a majority of them, and returned, one copy
of said charter to the chief executive officer of such
city, and the other to the Register of Deeds of the
county in which said city shall be situated. Such
proposed charter shall then be published in one or
more newspapers published and of general circula-
tion within said city, for at least twenty-one days, if
in a daily paper, or in three consecutive issues, if in
a weekly paper, and the first publication shall be
made within twenty days after the completion of
the charter, and within thirty days, and not earlier
than twenty days after such publication, it shall be
submitted to the qualified electors of said city at a
general or special election, and if a majority of such
qualified electors voting thereon shall ratify the
same, it shall thereafter be submitted to the Gover-
nor for his approval, and the Governor shall ap-
prove the same if it shall not be in conflict with the
Constitution and laws of this State. Upon such
approval it shall become the organic law of such
city and supersede any existing charter and all
amendments thereof and all ordinances inconsistent
with it. A copy of such charter, certified by the
chief executive officer, and authenticated by the
seal of such city, setting forth the submission of
such charter to the electors and its ratification by
them shall, after the approval of such charter by the
Governor, be made in duplicate and deposited, one
in the office of the Secretary of State, and the other,
after being recorded in the office of said Register of
Deeds, shall be deposited in the archives of the city;
and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of
said charter. The charter so ratified may be
amended by proposals therefor, submitted by the
legislative authority of the city to the qualified
electors thereof (or by petition as hereinafter
provided) at a general or special election, and
ratified by a majority of the qualified electors
voting thereon, and approved by the Governor as
herein provided for the approval of the charter.
37 Oregon Legislative Ore. Const. Section 2. Formation of corporations; municipal
Art. XI, §§ 2, charters; intoxicating liquor regulation.
2a (2007).
Corporations may be formed under general laws,
but shall not be created by the Legislative Assem-
bly by special laws. The Legislative Assembly shall
not enact, amend or repeal any charter or act of
incorporation for any municipality, city or town.
The legal voters of every city and town are hereby
granted power to enact and amend their municipal
charter, subject to the Constitution and criminal
laws of the State of Oregon, and the exclusive
power to license, regulate, control, or to suppress or
prohibit, the sale of intoxicating liquors therein is
vested in such municipality; but such municipality
shall within its limits be subject to the provisions of
the local option law of the State of Oregon.
Section 2a. Merger of adjoining municipalities;
county-city consolidation.
(1) The Legislative Assembly, or the people by
the Initiative, may enact a general law providing a
method whereby an incorporated city or town or
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municipal corporation may surrender its charter and
be merged into an adjoining city or town, provided
a majority of the electors of each of the incorpo-
rated cities or towns or municipal corporations
affected authorize the surrender or merger, as the
case may be.
(2) In all counties having a city therein containing
over 300,000 inhabitants, the county and city
government thereof may be consolidated in such
manner as may be provided by law with one set of
officers. The consolidated county and city may be
incorporated under general laws providing for
incorporation for municipal purposes. The provi-
sions of this Constitution applicable to cities, and
also those applicable to counties, so far as not
inconsistent or prohibited to cities, shall be applica-
ble to such consolidated government.
38 Pennsylvania Legislative Pa. Const. Art. § 2. Home rule
9, § 2 (2008)
Municipalities shall have the right and power to
frame and adopt home rule charters. Adoption,
amendment or repeal of a home rule charter shall
be by referendum. The General Assembly shall
provide the procedure by which a home rule charter
may be framed and its adoption, amendment or
repeal presented to the electors. If the General
Assembly does not so provide, a home rule charter
or a procedure for framing and presenting a home
rule charter may be presented to the electors by
initiative or by the governing body of the munici-
pality. A municipality which has a home rule
charter may exercise any power or perform any
function not denied by this Constitution, by its
home rule charter or by the General Assembly at
any time.
39 Rhode Island Imperio RI. Const. § 2. Local legislative powers
Art. XIII, § 2
(2009) Every city and town shall have the power at any
time to adopt a charter, amend its charter, enact and
amend local laws relating to its property, affairs
and government not inconsistent with this Constitu-
tion and laws enacted by the general assembly in
conformity with the powers reserved to the general
assembly.
40 South Caro- Imperio S.C. Code § 5-7-30. Powers conferred upon municipalities;
lina Ann. § 5-7-30 surtax for parking spaces.
(2007)
Each municipality of the State, in addition to the
powers conferred to its specific form of govern-
ment, may enact regulations, resolutions, and
ordinances, not inconsistent with the Constitution
and general law of this State, including the exercise
of powers in relation to roads, streets, markets, law
enforcement, health, and order in the municipality
or respecting any subject which appears to it
necessary and proper for the security, general
welfare, and convenience of the municipality or for
preserving health, peace, order, and good govern-
ment in it, including the authority to levy and
collect taxes on real and personal property and as
otherwise authorized in this section, make assess-
ments, and establish uniform service charges
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relating to them; the authority to abate nuisances;
the authority to provide police protection in con-
tiguous municipalities and in unincorporated areas
located not more than three miles from the munici-
pal limits upon the request and agreement of the
governing body of such contiguous municipality or
the county, including agreement as to the bounda-
ries of such police jurisdictional areas, in which
case the municipal law enforcement officers shall
have the full jurisdiction, authority, rights, privi-
leges, and immunities, including coverage under
the workers' compensation law, which they have in
the municipality, including the authority to make
arrests, and to execute criminal process within the
extended jurisdictional area; provided, however,
that this shall not extend the effect of the laws of
the municipality beyond its corporate boundaries;
grant franchises for the use of public streets and
make charges for them; grant franchises and make
charges for the use of public beaches; engage in the
recreation function; levy a business license tax on
gross income, but a wholesaler delivering goods to
retailers in a municipality is not subject to the
business license tax unless he maintains within the
corporate limits of the municipality a warehouse or
mercantile establishment for the distribution of
wholesale goods; and a business engaged in making
loans secured by real estate is not subject to the
business license tax unless it has premises located
within the corporate limits of the municipality and
no entity which is exempt from the license tax
under another law nor a subsidiary or affiliate of an
exempt entity is subject to the business license tax;
borrow in anticipation of taxes; and pledge reve-
nues to be collected and the full faith and credit of
the municipality against its note and conduct
advisory referenda. The municipal governing body
may fix fines and penalties for the violation of
municipal ordinances and regulations not exceeding
five hundred dollars or imprisonment not exceeding
thirty days, or both.
For the purpose of providing and maintaining
parking for the benefit of a downtown commercial
area, a municipality may levy a surtax upon the
business license of a person doing business in a
designated area in an amount not to exceed fifty
percent of the current yearly business license tax
upon terms and conditions fixed by ordinance of
the municipal council. The area must be designated
by council only after a petition is submitted by not
less than two-thirds of the persons paying a busi-
ness license tax in the area and who paid not less
than one-half of the total business license tax
collected for the preceding calendar year requesting
the designation of the area. The business within the
designated area which is providing twenty-five or
more parking spaces for customer use is required to
pay not more than twenty-five percent of a surtax
levied pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph.
41 South Dakota Legislative S.D. Const. § 2.
Article IX, § 2
(2008) Any county or city or combinations thereof may
provide for the adoption or amendment of a charter.
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Such charter shall be adopted or amended if ap-
proved at an election by a majority of the votes cast
thereon. Not less than ten per cent of those voting
in the last preceding gubernatorial election in the
affected jurisdiction may by petition initiate the
question of whether to adopt or amend a charter.
A chartered governmental unit may exercise any
legislative power or perform any function not
denied by its charter, the Constitution or the general
laws of the state. The charter may provide for any
form of executive, legislative and administrative
structure which shall be of superior authority to
statute, provided that the legislative body so estab-
lished be chosen by popular election and that the
administrative proceedings be subject to judicial
review.
Powers and functions of home rule units shall be
construed liberally.
42 Tennessee Legislative Tenn. Const. Sec. 9. Power over local affairs - Home rule for
Art. XI, § 9 cities and counties -- Consolidation of functions.
(2009)
The Legislature shall have the right to vest such
powers in the Courts of Justice, with regard to
private and local affairs, as may be expedient.
The General Assembly shall have no power to pass
a special, local or private act having the effect of
removing the incumbent from any municipal or
county office or abridging the term or altering the
salary prior to the end of the term for which such
public officer was selected, and any act of the
General Assembly private or local in form or effect
applicable to a particular county or municipality
either in its governmental or its proprietary capacity
shall be void and of no effect unless the act by its
terms either requires the approval by a two-thirds
vote of the local legislative body of the municipal-
ity or county, or requires approval in an election by
a majority of those voting in said election in the
municipality or county affected.
Any municipality may by ordinance submit to its
qualified voters in a general or special election the
question: "Shall this municipality adopt home
rule?"
In the event of an affirmative vote by a majority of
the qualified voters voting thereon, and until the
repeal thereof by the same procedure, such munici-
pality shall be a home rule municipality, and the
General Assembly shall act with respect to such
home rule municipality only by laws which are
general in terms and effect.
Any municipality after adopting home rule may
continue to operate under its existing charter, or
amend the same, or adopt and thereafter amend a
new charter to provide for its governmental and
proprietary powers, duties and functions, and for
the form, structure, personnel and organization of
its government, provided that no charter provision
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except with respect to compensation of municipal
personnel shall be effective if inconsistent with any
general act of the General Assembly and provided
further that the power of taxation of such munici-
pality shall not be enlarged or increased except by
general act of the General Assembly. The General
Assembly shall by general law provide the exclu-
sive methods by which municipalities may be
created, merged, consolidated and dissolved and by
which municipal boundaries may be altered.
A charter or amendment may be proposed by
ordinance of any home rule municipality, by a
charter commission provided for by act of the
General Assembly and elected by the qualified
voters of a home rule municipality voting thereon
or, in the absence of such act of the General As-
sembly, by a charter commission of seven (7)
members, chosen at large not more often than once
in two (2) years, in a municipal election pursuant to
petition for such election signed by qualified voters
of a home rule municipality not less in number than
ten (10%) percent of those voting in the then most
recent general municipal election.
It shall be the duty of the legislative body of such
municipality to publish any proposal so made and
to submit the same to its qualified voters at the first
general state election which shall be held at least
sixty (60) days after such publication and such
proposal shall become effective sixty (60) days
after approval by a majority of the qualified voters
voting thereon.
The General Assembly shall not authorize any
municipality to tax incomes, estates, or inheri-
tances, or to impose any other tax not authorized by
Sections 28 or 29 of Article II of this Constitution.
Nothing herein shall be construed as invalidating
the provisions of any municipal charter in existence
at the time of the adoption of this amendment.
The General Assembly may provide for the con-
solidation of any or all of the governmental and
corporate functions now or hereafter vested in
municipal corporations with the governmental and
corporate functions now or hereafter vested in the
counties in which such municipal corporations are
located; provided, such consolidations shall not
become effective until submitted to the qualified
voters residing within the municipal corporation
and in the county outside thereof, and approved by
a majority of those voting within the municipal
corporation and by a majority of those voting in the
county outside the municipal corporation.
43 Texas Legislative Tex. Const. § 5. Cities of More Than 5,000 Population; Adop-
Art. XI, § 5 tion or Amendment of Charters; Taxes; Debt
(2009) Restrictions
Cities having more than five thousand (5000)
inhabitants may, by a majority vote of the qualified
voters of said city, at an election held for that
purpose, adopt or amend their charters. If the
number of inhabitants of cities that have adopted or
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amended their charters under this section is reduced
to five thousand (5000) or fewer, the cities still may
amend their charters by a majority vote of the
qualified voters of said city at an election held for
that purpose. The adoption or amendment of
charters is subject to such limitations as may be
prescribed by the Legislature, and no charter or any
ordinance passed under said charter shall contain
any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of
the State, or of the general laws enacted by the
Legislature of this State. Said cities may levy,
assess and collect such taxes as may be authorized
by law or by their charters; but no tax for any
purpose shall ever be lawful for any one year,
which shall exceed two and one-half per cent of the
taxable property of such city, and no debt shall ever
be created by any city, unless at the same time
provision be made to assess and collect annually a
sufficient sum to pay the interest thereon and
creating a sinking fund of at least two per cent
thereon. Furthermore, no city charter shall be
altered, amended or repealed oftener than every two
years.
44 Utah Imperio Utah Const. § 5. [Cities and towns not to be created by special
Art. Xl, § 5 laws - Legislature to provide for the incorporation,
(2008) organization, dissolution, and classification of cities
and towns -- Charter cities.]
The Legislature may not create cities or towns by
special laws.
The Legislature by statute shall provide for the
incorporation, organization and dissolution of cities
and towns and for their classification in proportion
to population. Any incorporated city or town may
frame and adopt a charter for its own government
in the following manner:
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-
thirds vote of its members, and upon petition of
qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent
of all votes cast at the next preceding election for
the office of the mayor, shall forthwith provide by
ordinance for the submission to the electors of the
question: "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a
charter?" The ordinance shall require that the
question be submitted to the electors at the next
regular municipal election. The ballot containing
such question shall also contain the names of
candidates for members of the proposed commis-
sion, but without party designation. Such candi-
dates shall be nominated in the same manner as
required by law for nomination of city officers. If a
majority of the electors voting on the question of
choosing a commission shall vote in the affirma-
five, then the fifteen candidates receiving a majority
of the votes cast at such election, shall constitute
the charter commission, and shall proceed to frame
a charter.
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the
qualified electors of the city at an election to be
held at a time to be determined by the charter
commission, which shall be not less than sixty days
subsequent to its completion and distribution
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among the electors and not more than one year
from such date. Alternative provisions may also be
submitted to be voted upon separately. The com-
mission shall make provisions for the distribution
of copies of the proposed charter and of any alter-
native provisions to the qualified electors of the
city, not less than sixty days before the election at
which it is voted upon. Such proposed charter and
such alternative provisions as are approved by a
majority of the electors voting thereon, shall
become an organic law of such city at such time as
may be fixed therein, and shall supersede any
existing charter and all laws affecting the organiza-
tion and government of such city which are now in
conflict therewith. Within thirty days after its
approval a copy of such charter as adopted, certi-
fied by the mayor and city recorder and authenti-
cated by the seal of such city, shall be made in
duplicate and deposited, one in the office of the
secretary of State and the other in the office of the
city recorder, and thereafter all courts shall take
judicial notice of such charter.
Amendments to any such charter may be framed
and submitted by a charter commission in the same
manner as provided for making of charters, or may
be proposed by the legislative authority of the city
upon a two-thirds vote thereof, or by petition of
qualified electors to a number equal to fifteen per
cent of the total votes cast for mayor on the next
preceding election, and any such amendment may
be submitted at the next regular municipal election,
and having been approved by the majority of the
electors voting thereon, shall become part of the
charter at the time fixed in such amendment and
shall be certified and filed as provided in case of
charters.
Each city forming its charter under this section
shall have, and is hereby granted, the authority to
exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs,
and to adopt and enforce within its limits, local
police, sanitary and similar regulations not in
conflict with the general law, and no enumeration
of powers in this constitution or any law shall be
deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of
authority hereby conferred; but this grant of author-
ity shall not include the power to regulate public
utilities, not municipally owned, if any such regula-
tion of public utilities is provided for by general
law, nor be deemed to limit or restrict the power of
the legislature in matters relating to State affairs, to
enact general laws applicable alike to all cities of
the State.
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this
section shall include the following:
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow
money, within the limits prescribed by general law,
and to levy and collect special assessments for
benefits conferred.
(b) To furnish all local public services, to pur-
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chase, hire, construct, own, maintain and operate,
or lease, public utilities local in extent and use; to
acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within or
without the corporate limits, property necessary for
any such purposes, subject to restrictions imposed
by general law for the protection of other communi-
ties; and to grant local public utility franchises and
within its powers regulate the exercise thereof.
(c) To make local public improvements and to
acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, property
within its corporate limits necessary for such
improvements; and also to acquire an excess over
than [that] needed for any such improvement and to
sell or lease such excess property with restrictions,
in order to protect and preserve the improvement.
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any
such excess property, or of any public utility owned
by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or both,
including, in the case of public utility, a franchise
stating the terms upon which, in case of foreclo-
sure, the purchaser may operate such utility.
45 Vermont
46 Virginia Imperio Va. Code § 15.2-1102. General grant of power; enumeration
Ann. § 15.2- of powers not exclusive; limitations on exercise of
1102 (2009) power
A municipal corporation shall have and may
exercise all powers which it now has or which may
hereafter be conferred upon or delegated to it under
the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth
and all other powers pertinent to the conduct of the
affairs and functions of the municipal government,
the exercise of which is not expressly prohibited by
the Constitution and the general laws of the Com-
monwealth, and which are necessary or desirable to
secure and promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the municipality and the safety,
health, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
morals, trade, commerce and industry of the mu-
nicipality and the inhabitants thereof, and the
enumeration of specific powers shall not be con-
strued or held to be exclusive or as a limitation
upon any general grant of power, but shall be
construed and held to be in addition to any general
grant of power. The exercise of the powers con-
ferred under this section is specifically limited to
the area within the corporate limits of the munici-
pality, unless otherwise conferred in the applicable
sections of the Constitution and general laws, as
amended, of the Commonwealth.
47 Washington Legislative Wash. Const. § 10. Incorporation of municipalities
Art. XI,§ 10
(2009) Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be
created by special laws; but the legislature, by
general laws, shall provide for the incorporation,
organization and classification in proportion to
population, of cities and towns, which laws may be
altered, amended or repealed. Cities and towns
heretofore organized, or incorporated may become
organized under such general laws whenever a
majority of the electors voting at a general election,
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shall so determine, and shall organize in conformity
therewith; and cities or towns heretofore or hereaf-
ter organized, and all charters thereof framed or
adopted by authority of this Constitution shall be
subject to and controlled by general laws. Any city
containing a population of ten thousand inhabitants,
or more, shall be permitted to frame a charter for its
own government, consistent with and subject to the
Constitution and laws of this state, and for such
purpose the legislative authority of such city may
cause an election to be had at which election there
shall be chosen by the qualified electors of said
city, fifteen freeholders thereof, who shall have
been residents of said city for a period of at least
two years preceding their election and qualified
electors, whose duty it shall be to convene within
ten days after their election, and prepare and
propose a charter for such city. Such proposed
charter shall be submitted to the qualified electors
of said city, and if a majority of such qualified
electors voting thereon ratify the same, it shall
become the charter of said city, and shall become
the organic law thereof, and supersede any existing
charter including amendments thereto, and all
special laws inconsistent with such charter. Said
proposed charter shall be published in the daily
newspaper of largest general circulation published
in the area to be incorporated as a first class city
under the charter or, if no daily newspaper is
published therein, then in the newspaper having the
largest general circulation within such area at least
once each week for four weeks next preceding the
day of submitting the same to the electors for their
approval, as above provided. All elections in this
section authorized shall only be had upon notice,
which notice shall specify the object of calling such
election, and shall be given as required by law. Said
elections may be general or special elections, and
except as herein provided shall be governed by the
law regulating and controlling general or special
elections in said city. Such charter may be amended
by proposals therefor submitted by the legislative
authority of such city to the electors thereof at any
general election after notice of said submission
published as above specified, and ratified by a
majority of the qualified electors voting thereon. In
submitting any such charter, or amendment thereto,
any alternate article or proposition may be pre-
sented for the choice of the voters, and may be
voted on separately without prejudice to others.
48 West Virginia Imperio W. Va. Const. § 39(a). Home Rule for Municipalities
Art. VI, § 39a
(2008) No local or special law shall hereafter be passed
incorporating cities, towns or villages, or amending
their charters. The legislature shall provide by
general laws for the incorporation and government
of cities, towns and villages and shall classify such
municipal corporations, upon the basis of popula-
tion, into not less than two nor more than five
classes. Such general laws shall restrict the powers
of such cities, towns and villages to borrow money
and contract debts, and shall limit the rate of taxes
for municipal purposes, in accordance with section
one, article ten of the Constitution of the State of
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West Virginia. Under such general laws, the
electors of each municipal corporation, wherein the
population exceeds two thousand, shall have power
and authority to frame, adopt and amend the charter
of such corporation, or to amend an existing charter
thereof, and through its legally constituted author-
ity, may pass all laws and ordinances relating to its
municipal affairs: Provided, that any such charter or
amendment thereto, and any such law or ordinance
so adopted, shall be invalid and void if inconsistent
or in conflict with this Constitution or the general
laws of the State then in effect, or thereafter, from
time to time enacted.
49 Wisconsin Imperio Wis. Const. Section 3. Municipal home rule; debt limit; tax to
Art. XI, § 3 pay debt.
(2008)
[As amended Nov. 1874, Nov. 1912, Nov. 1924,
See Bleck v. Nov. 1932, April 1951, April 1955, Nov. 1960,
Monona April 1961, April 1963, April 1966 and April 1981]
Village, 148
N.W.2d 708 (1) Cities and villages organized pursuant to state
(1967) (deter- law may determine their local affairs and govern-
mining that ment, subject only to this constitution and to such
home rule enactments of the legislature of statewide concern
applies to as with uniformity shall affect every city or every
local govern- village. The method of such determination shall be
ments only prescribed by the legislature.
when they
have first been (2) No county, city, town, village, school district,
validly organ- sewerage district or other municipal corporation
ized pursuant may become indebted in an amount that exceeds an
to state law). allowable percentage of the taxable property
located therein equalized for state purposes as
provided by the legislature. In all cases the allow-
able percentage shall be 5 percent except as speci-
fied in pars. (a) and (b):
(a) For any city authorized to issue bonds for
school purposes, an additional 10 percent shall be
permitted for school purposes only, and in such
cases the territory attached to the city for school
purposes shall be included in the total taxable
property supporting the bonds issued for school
purposes.
(b) For any school district which offers no less than
grades one to 12 and which at the time of incurring
such debt is eligible for the highest level of school
aids, 10 percent shall be permitted.
(3) Any county, city, town, village, school district,
sewerage district or other municipal corporation
incun-ing any indebtedness under sub. (2) shall,
before or at the time of doing so, provide for the
collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay
the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to
pay and discharge the principal thereof within 20
years from the time of contracting the same.
(4) When indebtedness under sub. (2) is incurred in
the acquisition of lands by cities, or by counties or
sewerage districts having a population of 150,000
or over, for public, municipal purposes, or for the
permanent improvement thereof, or to purchase,
acquire, construct, extend, add to or improve a
2009] HOME RULE AND JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 1423
sewage collection or treatment system which
services all or a part of such city or county, the city,
county or sewerage district incurring the indebted-
ness shall, before or at the time of so doing, provide
for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to
pay the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also
to pay and discharge the principal thereof within a
period not exceeding 50 years from the time of
contracting the same.
(5) An indebtedness created for the purpose of
purchasing, acquiring, leasing, constructing, ex-
tending, adding to, improving, conducting, control-
ling, operating or managing a public utility of a
town, village, city or special district, and secured
solely by the property or income of such public
utility, and whereby no municipal liability is
created, shall not be considered an indebtedness of
such town, village, city or special district, and shall
not be included in arriving at the debt limitation
under sub. (2).
50 Wyoming lmperio Wyo. Const. § 1. Incorporation; alteration of boundaries;
Art. 13, § I merger, consolidation; dissolution; determination of
(2008) local affairs; classification; referendum; liberal
construction
(a) The legislature shall provide by general law,
applicable to all cities and towns,
(i) For the incorporation of cities,
(ii) For the methods by which city and town
boundaries may be altered, and
(iii) For the procedures by which cities and towns
may be merged, consolidated or dissolved; pro-
vided that existing laws on such subjects and laws
pertaining to civil service, retirement, collective
bargaining, the levying of taxes, excises, fees, or
any other charges, whether or not applicable to all
cities and towns on the effective date of this
amendment, shall remain in effect until superseded
by general law and such existing laws shall not be
subject to charter ordinance.
(b) All cities and towns are hereby empowered to
determine their local affairs and government as
established by ordinance passed by the governing
body, subject to referendum when prescribed by the
legislature, and further subject only to statutes
uniformly applicable to all cities and towns, and to
statutes prescribing limits of indebtedness. The
levying of taxes, excises, fees, or any other charges
shall be prescribed by the legislature. The legisla-
ture may not establish more than four (4) classes of
cities and towns. Each city and town shall be
governed by all other statutes, except as it may
exempt itself by charter ordinance as hereinafter
provided.
(c) Each city or town may elect that the whole or
any part of any statute, other than statutes uni-
formly applicable to all cities and towns and
statutes prescribing limits of indebtedness, may not
apply to such city or town. This exemption shall be
by charter ordinance passed by a two-thirds (2/3)
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vote of all members elected to the governing body
of the city or town. Each such charter ordinance
shall be titled and may provide that the whole or
any part of any statute, which would otherwise
apply to such city or town as specifically desig-
nated in the ordinance shall not apply to such city
or town. Such ordinance may provide other provi-
sions on the same subject. Every charter ordinance
shall be published once each week for two consecu-
tive weeks in the official city or town newspaper, if
any, otherwise in a newspaper of general circula-
tion in the city or town. No charter ordinance shall
take effect until the sixtieth (60th) day after its final
publication. If prior thereto, a petition, signed by a
number of qualified electors of the city or town,
equaling at least ten per cent (10%) of the number
of votes cast at the last general municipal election,
shall be filed in the office of the clerk of such city
or town, demanding that such ordinance be submit-
ted to referendum, then the ordinance shall not take
effect unless approved by a majority of the electors
voting thereon. Such referendum election shall be
called within thirty (30) days and held within ninety
(90) days after the petition is filed. An ordinance
establishing procedures, and fixing the date of such
election shall be passed by the governing body and
published once each week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in the official city or town newspaper, if any,
otherwise in a newspaper of general circulation in
the city or town. The question on the ballot shall
be: "Shall Charter Ordinance No.... Entitled
(stating the title of the ordinance) take effect?". The
governing body may submit, without a petition, any
charter ordinance to referendum election under the
procedures as previously set out. The charter
ordinance shall take effect if approved by a major-
ity of the electors voting thereon. An approved
charter ordinance, after becoming effective, shall be
recorded by the clerk in a book maintained for that
purpose with a certificate of the procedures of
adoption. A certified copy of the ordinance shall be
filed with the secretary of state, who shall keep an
index of such ordinances. Each charter ordinance
enacted shall prevail over any prior act of the
governing body of the city or town, and may be
repealed or amended only by subsequent charter
ordinance, or by enactments of the legislature
applicable to all cities and towns.
(d) The powers and authority granted to cities and
towns, pursuant to this section, shall be liberally
construed for the purpose of giving the largest
measure of self-government to cities and towns.
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